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INTRODUCTION 
Governments lie. They do so for many different reasons to a wide range of 
audiences on a variety of topics. Examples include lies about the government’s 
justifications for military action, such as allegations that Presidents Monroe and 
Madison lied to Congress about military activities in the then-territory of Florida,1 
that President Polk lied about the incidents leading the United States to engage in 
war with Mexico,2 that members of the Johnson administration lied about the events 
that spurred broader U.S. involvement in Vietnam,3 and that members of the Bush 
administration lied about the reasons for the U.S. invasion of Iraq.4 Other examples 
include deliberate falsehoods about whether a government official or agency acted 
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 1. See Peter W. Morgan, The Undefined Crime of Lying to Congress: Ethics Reform and 
the Rule of Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 177, 223 (1992).  
 2. See id. at 216–21. 
 3. See ERIC ALTERMAN, WHEN PRESIDENTS LIE 162 (2004); GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES 517 (2004) (“[The Pentagon Papers] revealed that the American government 
had systematically lied to the American people about the nature, purpose, conduct, and 
consequences of an ongoing war.”). 
 4. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, WHY LEADERS LIE 5 (2011). 
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in compliance with law,5 like those told by Nixon administration officials as part of 
the Watergate cover-up6 as well as Reagan administration officials’ alleged lies about 
their involvement in Nicaragua.7 Still others concern the existence or scope of a 
government program, such as the Eisenhower administration’s false claim that 
Francis Gary Powers’s U-2 plane was an off-track weather aircraft8 or Obama 
administration officials’ assertions about the sweep of domestic surveillance and data 
collection efforts.9 The list goes on and includes a wide range of lies to achieve 
various domestic and foreign policy goals, such as the Kennedy administration’s lies 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis about the extent of its knowledge of the location of 
Soviet missiles.10  
Although courts and commentators have extensively explored whether and when 
the First Amendment permits the government to regulate lies told by private 
speakers,11 relatively little attention has yet been paid to the constitutional 
implications of the government’s deliberate falsehoods.12 This Article helps fill that 
gap by exploring when, if ever, the Constitution prohibits our government from lying 
to us.  
The government’s lies can be devastating. This is the case, for example, of its lies 
told to resist legal and political accountability for its misconduct; to inflict economic 
and reputational harm; or to enable the exercise of its powers to imprison, to deploy 
lethal force, and to commit precious national resources. On the other hand, the 
government’s lies can sometimes be helpful: consider lies told to thwart a military 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 262–76 (2009) (describing 
Brandeis’s efforts in private practice to prove that President Taft had lied about whether he 
had personally investigated charges against, and prepared a memorandum exonerating, the 
Secretary of Interior).  
 6. See William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433, 458 (1999).  
 7. See ALTERMAN, supra note 3, at 240–41, 279–88.  
 8. See JIM NEWTON, EISENHOWER: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 313–15 (2011). 
 9. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security 
Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 467 (2014) (describing Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper’s testimony to Congress). 
 10. See Arthur Sylvester, The Government Has the Right to Lie, SATURDAY EVENING 
POST, Nov. 18, 1967, at 10 (acknowledging that during the Cuban Missile Crisis he—as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Kennedy—knowingly approved a press release 
that falsely stated that “‘the Pentagon has no information indicating the presence of offensive 
weapons in Cuba’”). 
 11. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (striking down a federal statute 
that criminalized certain lies about receiving military honors as a violation of the First 
Amendment); Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially 
Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008). 
 12. David Strauss and Jonathan Varat are among the exceptions, as they have considered 
the problem of government lies as part of broader explorations of lies’ First Amendment 
implications. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 355–59 (1991); Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: 
A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1108–10 
(2006). Others have examined the constitutionality of law enforcement officers’ lies. See infra 
notes 85–102 and accompanying text. 
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adversary or to identify wrongdoing through undercover police work. The substantial 
harms threatened by some government lies invite a search for ways to punish and 
prevent them. At the same time, however, the number of lies, the diversity of reasons 
for which they are told, and the variety of their effects combine to suggest that efforts 
to enforce blanket prohibitions against the government’s deliberate falsehoods would 
be both difficult and unwise.13 This Article seeks to identify constitutional and other 
approaches that attend to these concerns by constraining government lies that 
threaten especially serious harms. To this end, it examines when (and why) we find 
government lies most troubling, when those lies pose harms of constitutional 
magnitude, and when nonconstitutional options might more appropriately address 
the dangers of such lies. 
Part I considers the harms threatened by government lies as well as the challenges 
posed by efforts to constrain them. More specifically, it examines the specific harms of 
deception and breach of trust that the government’s deliberate falsehoods can inflict 
upon individual targets as well as upon the broader public. Like other forms of 
deception, the government’s lies not only inflict moral harm by undermining their 
targets’ autonomy but can also injure their targets’ interests in more tangible ways—as 
is the case, for example, of government lies that deprive their targets of life or liberty, 
or that impose reputational or economic damage. The government’s lies can also 
breach the public’s trust in ways that inflict not only the moral and ethical harms of 
disloyalty but also impose substantial instrumental costs to its effectiveness. Efforts to 
constrain the government’s lies, however, can pose dangers of their own, and Part I 
goes on to examine significant concerns about courts’ limited institutional competence, 
about undermining the separation of governmental powers, and about chilling 
government speakers’ willingness to engage in important expressive endeavors.  
Part II then searches for constitutional principles that attend to these competing 
concerns and proposes a framework for assessing the constitutionality of the 
government’s deliberate falsehoods. More specifically, it builds on due process and 
free speech theory and doctrine to identify when and how the government’s lies 
inflict the harms of deception and breach of trust in ways that endanger specific 
individual rights.  
First, it proposes that the government’s lies violate the Due Process Clause when 
they directly deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property or when they are 
sufficiently coercive to constitute the functional equivalent of such deprivations. 
Examples include prosecutors’ lies to judges and juries that lead to a defendant’s 
imprisonment; law enforcement officers’ lies that coerce their targets’ involuntary 
waiver of constitutional rights; and government lies that deprive their targets of the 
ability meaningfully to exercise voting, reproductive, or other protected rights. The 
government’s lies can also violate the Due Process Clause in those extreme 
circumstances when they lack any reasonable justification—that is, when they shock 
the conscience with their outrageousness—and thus constitute an abuse of 
governmental power.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining 
the difficulties raised by government efforts to regulate private speakers’ lies in light of “the 
pervasiveness of false statements, made for better or for worse motives, made thoughtlessly 
or deliberately, made with or without accompanying harm”).  
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Part II further proposes that the government’s lies violate the Free Speech Clause 
when they are sufficiently coercive of their targets’ beliefs or speech to constitute the 
functional equivalent of the government’s direct regulation of that expressive 
activity. Examples include the government’s lies to or about its critics to silence, 
deter, or otherwise punish their speech, or the government’s lies to captive or 
otherwise vulnerable audiences to manipulate their expressive choices. 
Because the Constitution does not provide the only possible constraint on the 
government’s deliberate falsehoods, Part III then explores various nonconstitutional 
means for addressing some harmful government lies. It identifies a menu of statutory 
and political possibilities that target the government’s deliberate falsehoods on 
certain subjects, to certain audiences, by certain speakers, or in other settings that 
threaten especially grave harm.  
Part IV applies these various approaches, both constitutional and nonconstitutional, 
to a range of problems. In so doing, it seeks to start a conversation about how courts, 
policymakers, and the public might think about the constitutional and other 
implications of the government’s lies. 
I start with several caveats. First, this Article addresses the collective speech of a 
government body or the speech of an individual empowered to speak for such a 
body.14 It does not address the very different constitutional issues raised by efforts to 
regulate lies by an individual government official when expressing her own views in 
a personal capacity.15 Unlike such individuals—who possess First Amendment rights 
of their own—the government is constrained rather than protected by the 
Constitution and does not itself hold First Amendment rights.16 Examples of the 
government’s own speech (to which the Article returns in Part IV) include a state 
agency that lies to certain audiences about when the polls will close in hopes of 
suppressing their vote and increasing its political allies’ re-election prospects, or that 
deliberately misstates unemployment rates to improve the incumbent’s prospects in 
an upcoming election. Or a governor’s office that issues an investigative report that 
deliberately and falsely covers up its own incompetence or illegal conduct. Or an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. See, e.g., Beth Orsoff, Note, Government Speech as Government Censorship, 67 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 229, 248 (1993) (“When a government official sends out a letter, pamphlet, or 
other written instrument on government stationery or government letterhead or uses any seal 
of the government, then the official has sent an official government communication.”).  
 15. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377–82 (2014) (discussing the First Amendment 
rights of individual public employees); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) 
(same). Elsewhere I address the constitutional implications of laws that punish campaign lies 
by individual candidates who have First Amendment rights of their own. See Helen Norton, 
Lies to Manipulate, Misappropriate, and Acquire Governmental Power in LAW AND LIES 143, 
176–90 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015). 
 16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment protects the press from governmental 
interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government.” (emphasis in original)); 
MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 44–45 (1983) (arguing that government does not 
possess First Amendment free speech rights). As explained in more detail, infra notes 125–27 
and accompanying text, the Court’s recognition of a government speech defense to Free Speech 
Clause claims is better understood as holding that government has a privilege, rather than a right, 
to its own speech. 
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agency that posts on its website a press release stating that one of its critics had 
engaged in illegal misconduct when it knows she had not. Or an Office of the 
Surgeon General that undertakes an informational campaign in the public schools 
that seeks to boost sales of a product manufactured by the administration’s political 
ally by falsely reporting its health effects. Or a President who, in order to build 
support for military action abroad, tells Congress and the public in her State of the 
Union address that she has evidence that a foreign government violated American 
territorial space when she knows that she does not possess such evidence. 
Second, this Article focuses on the constitutional implications of the 
government’s lies to the American public, not those to non-Americans abroad.17  
Finally, in this Article I use “lie” to mean a false assertion of fact known by the 
speaker to be untrue and made with the intention that the listener understand it to be 
true.18 This Article thus focuses only on the government’s deliberate falsehoods, 
rather than on the many other ways in which the government may intentionally or 
unintentionally mislead the public through, for example, secrets or accidental 
inaccuracies.19 I chose this narrower scope in large part because the moral and 
instrumental harms caused by the government’s intentional lies are arguably greater 
than those caused by its nondisclosures and inaccuracies more generally, and thus 
make more immediate demands for our attention.20 I recognize not only that others 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. The Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Constitution does not generally protect 
noncitizens overseas. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1990) 
(declining to apply Fourth Amendment protections extraterritorially to aliens); Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784–85 (1950) (declining to apply Fifth Amendment protections 
extraterritorially to aliens). 
 18. See DAVID NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH 50 (1993) (“[W]e can say that lying 
means making a statement (not too vague) you want somebody to believe, even though you 
don’t (completely) believe it yourself, when the other person has a right to expect you mean 
what you say.”); Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies”: The Constitutionality of Regulating False 
Statements of Fact 2 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 11-02, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737930 [http://perma.cc
/Q2S8-EEHU] (defining a lie as “(a) a false statement, (b) known by the person making it to 
be false, and (c) made with the intention that at least some listeners will believe the statement 
to be true, at least for some period before its falsity becomes evident to the listeners” (citation 
omitted)).  
 19. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 13 (1978) 
(describing the many ways in which a speaker can deceive her audience, including “through 
gesture, through disguise, by means of action or inaction, even through silence”). A number 
of thoughtful commentators have addressed in detail the potential harms of certain government 
secrets. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 881, 885 (2008). 
 20. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts 
Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 177 (2001) 
(distinguishing various types of deception more broadly as “afford[ing] the listener the 
opportunity for more precise questioning, which bald-faced lies generally do not”); Mark 
Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 1203, 1235 (2008) (“[T]he harm caused by sincerely believed false speech is generally 
outweighed by its capacity to drive argumentation, which in turn furthers the collection, 
dissemination, and preservation of evidence supporting true beliefs.”); Strauss, supra note 12, 
at 356 (“Ordinarily, withholding information is not as effective as lying [in offending listener 
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may choose to define a “lie” differently21 but also that determinations of what is (and 
is not) a lie in a particular situation can be deeply contested regardless of the 
definition one selects.22 Here I do not seek to revisit debates about whether the 
government did or did not lie in any given instance. Although thoughtful observers 
may well disagree about the size and shape of the universe of government lies, I 
assume for purposes of this Article that there is some universe of government lies 
and consider what, if anything, the Constitution has to say about it.  
I. THE POTENTIAL HARMS OF GOVERNMENT LIES AND OF EFFORTS  
TO CONSTRAIN THEM 
This Part starts by considering the variety of ways in which the government’s lies 
can cause moral and instrumental harm to specific individuals as well as to the public 
collectively.23 It then examines the substantial chilling, institutional competence, and 
separation of powers issues raised by efforts to enforce limitations on the 
government’s lies. As we shall see, there are good reasons for concern about 
government lies, as well as good reasons to worry about efforts to constrain them. 
A. The Harms Threatened by the Government’s Lies 
Although in many respects the harms of government lies track those of 
nongovernmental speakers more generally (e.g., in their disrespect for listeners’ 
autonomy and dignity),24 the government’s deliberate falsehoods can also threaten 
distinct and especially serious damage precisely because of their governmental 
source. This subpart describes government lies’ potential harms to specific 
                                                                                                                 
 
autonomy] because a lie affirmatively throws the hearer off the track.”).  
 21. See, e.g., SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY AND 
THE LAW 116 (2014) (“[A] lie is an assertion that the speaker knows she does not believe, but 
nevertheless deliberately asserts, in a context that, objectively interpreted, represents that 
assertion as to be taken by the listener as true and as believed by the speaker. . . . [W]hat I call 
‘pure lies’ need not involve deception or the intent to deceive. They need not even be false; a 
speaker may lie by asserting what she believes to be false yet, unbeknownst to her, happens to 
be true.”). 
 22. See Steven R. Morrison, When is Lying Illegal? When Should It Be? A Critical 
Analysis of the Federal False Statements Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 111, 116–17 (2009) 
(questioning whether truth and falsity are meaningfully distinguishable for certain legal 
purposes).  
 23. Although this Part focuses on the harms that lies inflict upon listeners or targets, lies 
may harm the individual liars themselves in both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist 
ways. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 60 (1978) (discussing arguments that lies 
undermine the dignity and humanity of the liar); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police 
Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 468 (1996) (“Lying leads to a loss of integrity 
individual to the [police] officer. . . . In a society that generally condemns lying, using that 
tactic diminishes one’s self respect. Officers have feelings of regret for their lying, even though 
they value its believed utility.”).  
 24. Elsewhere I have discussed some of the harms threatened by nongovernmental 
speakers’ lies. Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 185–200.  
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individuals as well as to the general public, and how those harms may vary with the 
lies’ motive, subject matter, and audience. 
1. Deception 
The harms of lies in general and lies by the government in particular center on the 
liar’s effort to manipulate the listener in ways that are inherently disrespectful of the 
listener’s autonomy and dignity. As Harry Frankfurt explains,  
The most irreducibly bad thing about lies is that they contrive to 
interfere with, and to impair, our natural effort to apprehend the real state 
of affairs. They are designed to prevent us from being in touch with what 
is really going on. In telling his lie, the liar tries to mislead us into 
believing that the facts are other than they actually are. He tries to impose 
his will on us.25  
Government lies on certain topics or to certain audiences may be especially 
successful in manipulating listeners because they may be more likely to be believed 
and less amenable to rebuttal by counterspeech.26 Examples include the 
government’s lies on matters on which the government has a monopoly or to which 
it has other special access (e.g., executive branch lies about certain national security 
and intelligence topics) as well as government lies to vulnerable audiences (e.g., to 
young children in the public schools). 
Lies not only inflict moral harm by undermining their target’s autonomy, but they 
can also set back their target’s interests in more tangible ways.27 More specifically, 
some government lies can deprive their targets of life or liberty—as is the case, for 
example, of lies told by prosecutors to secure criminal convictions.28 The lies told by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. Harry Frankfurt, On Truth, Lies, and Bullshit, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION 37, 37 
(Clancy Martin ed., 2009); see also FRIED, supra note 23, at 67 (“Lying is wrong because when 
I lie I set up a relation which is essentially exploitative. . . . When I lie, I lay claim to your mind.”); 
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736–37 (1987) (“The 
case for honesty in all human relations, I believe, rests in part on the importance of treating 
others with respect: lack of candor often carries with it the implication that the listener is less 
capable of dealing with the truth, and thus less worthy of respect, than the speaker.”).  
 26. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Bush, Obama and Beyond: Observations on the Prospect 
of Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims before the Use of Force, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 433, 442 (2010) (“A barrier to achieving this kind of contemporaneous 
accountability for threat claims asserted by the executive department to build support for the 
use of force is its superior access to and control over the intelligence information that forms 
the basis of the claims.”). 
 27. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING 34–39 (2006) 
(distinguishing “morally wrongful” acts as those that intrinsically violate a freestanding moral 
duty from “harmful” acts as those that inflict consequences that set back another’s interests or 
otherwise interfere with her well-being). 
 28. See Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a prosecutor’s 
knowingly false statements to the jury that a key government witness had not confessed to 
murder were fundamentally unfair and thus a violation of due process); United States v. 
Kalfayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a prosecutor’s knowingly false 
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government officials to justify the internment of thousands of Japanese American 
citizens during World War II offer a particularly egregious example: 
The evidence of the government’s misconduct in these cases is clear 
and compelling, and rests on the government’s own records. It reveals that 
high government officials, including the Solicitor General, knowingly 
presented the Supreme Court with false and fabricated records, both in 
briefs and oral arguments, that misled the Court and resulted in decisions 
that deprived the petitioners in these cases of their rights to fair hearings of 
their challenges to military orders that were based, not on legitimate fears 
that they—and all Japanese Americans—posed a danger of espionage and 
sabotage on the West Coast, but rather reflected the racism of the general 
who promulgated the orders. 29 
Other government lies may inflict reputational or economic damage upon their 
individual targets.30 Examples include law enforcement agency lies that falsely brand 
individuals as criminals31 and government officials’ false declarations that targeted 
individuals have engaged in other forms of misconduct.32 Government lies can also 
inflict tangible harm upon the American public collectively. Government lies to 
justify the deployment of troops, for instance, can result in demonstrable injury 
through the loss of life and the depletion of national resources.33  
                                                                                                                 
 
statement to the jury that an absent witness could have refused to testify was willful 
prosecutorial misconduct of sufficiently prejudicial nature to violate due process).  
 29. PETER IRONS, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE CASE FOR SUPREME COURT REPUDIATION OF 
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 4 (2013); see also Korematsu v. United States, 
584 F. Supp. 1406, 1418–22 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting Mr. Korematsu’s coram nobis petition 
and describing evidence of government lies in the earlier proceedings); Eric K. Yamamoto, 
White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President 
Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 292–93 (2005) 
(describing lies by the executive and military to the public and the courts that sought to justify 
the internment). 
 30. For discussion of the reputational and economic harms threatened by government 
agencies’ inaccurate assertions (including but not limited to those that are intentionally false), 
see Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2011) (“Agency publicity can be premature, excessive, misleading, 
or just plain wrong.”); James O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites: Exploring Remedies 
for Federal Internet Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (2003) (describing how agency 
website statements may be inaccurate in ways that harm their targets). 
 31. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695 (1976) (describing police department’s allegedly 
defamatory description of the target as an “active shoplifter[]”).  
 32. For examples of alleged defamation by various government officials, see Hutchinson 
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 123 (1979) (senator issued press releases and newsletters criticizing 
researcher’s studies); Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 312–13 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(Congressman wrote—and released to the press—a letter complaining that legal services 
attorney was obstructing enforcement of child support laws); Nadel v. Regents of Univ. of 
Cal., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (state government officials issued press 
releases and press statements claiming that protestors had engaged in violent and destructive 
behavior).  
 33. See Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, The Public-Private Distinction, and 
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2. Breach of Trust 
By violating its public’s trust, the government’s lies can inflict moral harms of 
disloyalty in addition to and distinct from the harms of deception.34 Seana Shiffrin, 
for example, has emphasized that  
the primary, distinctive wrong of lies as such does not inhere in their 
deceptive effect, if any, on listeners, but instead in their abuse of the 
mechanism by which we provide reliable testimonial warrants, a 
mechanism we must safeguard if we are to understand and cooperate 
with one another and to achieve our mandatory moral ends.35  
As Professor Shiffrin explains, lies by the government can pose especially grave 
dangers of this sort:  
Politically, those in charge of putting our joint moral commitments into 
action and enforcing them—namely, state officials—are well placed to 
serve as points of triangulation, expositors, and repositories of our best 
information about the law and its moral and political underpinnings. We 
need salient common sources of information to help us locate the relevant 
moral and legal facts and to identify the content of the joint perception 
of those facts. We also need to know that officials believe these to be the 
relevant facts, if those officials are to merit the role of a legitimate 
political (not merely epistemic) authority. Thus, state officials, at least in 
a democracy, must aspire to be relevant epistemic authorities on the law 
and on at least that aspect of morality embodied in law. We should be 
able to rely on their transmissions about the content of law, legally 
relevant morality, and legally relevant facts.36  
Public fiduciary theory offers a related way of understanding the government’s 
lies as acts of disloyalty that inflict substantial collective harm by violating the 
public’s trust. Drawing from private law’s imposition of fiduciary obligations upon 
those who have discretionary power over the interests of others, this growing body 
of literature observes that government actors assert the same sort of power with 
respect to the public; public fiduciary theorists thus urge the public (as beneficiary) 
to expect the same loyalty from its government as it would from other fiduciaries.37 
                                                                                                                 
 
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 103 
(2004) (“Wars kill people, topple governments, and scar survivors and the ecosystems they 
inhabit. In no other context can government error or malfeasance do greater harm.”). 
 34. See Alan Strudler, Deception and Trust, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION, supra 
note 25, at 139, 152 (“It is always morally unacceptable to deceive a person in a way that 
breaches his trust, unless that deception is necessary to defend against a grave wrong. But it 
may be morally acceptable to defend [sic] a person in the absence of trust if that deception is 
necessary to defend against an action that may thwart one’s legitimate interests.”); see also 
GREEN, supra note 27, at 103 (distinguishing the moral harms of disloyalty—i.e., breach of 
trust—from other morally wrongful acts). 
 35. SHIFFRIN, supra note 21, at 116.  
 36. Id. at 198 (emphasis in original). 
 37. See David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative 
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The government’s self-interested lies to its public can thus breach the public’s trust 
in, and expectations of loyalty from, its government. 
Government lies breach the public’s trust in ways that can inflict not only such 
moral and ethical harms but also substantial instrumental costs. John Mearsheimer 
describes these costs to include thwarting the public’s ability to hold government 
accountable for misconduct, frustrating citizens’ ability to make informed voting 
choices, undermining the policy-making process when participants cannot rely on 
others’ assertions, and alienating the public’s faith in democratic governance.38 The 
less the public trusts the government, the less the public will cooperate with it, and 
the less effective the government, in turn, will be—with the public suffering 
collective harm as a result.39 As just one illustration, the various lies told by 
government officials as part of the Watergate cover-up imposed these sorts of 
instrumental costs to public trust and confidence.40 Relatedly, some commentators 
argue that lies by law enforcement officers to secure confessions or consent to search 
can undermine citizens’ willingness to trust and cooperate with the police in ways 
that frustrate law enforcement’s effectiveness.41 Judges’ lies similarly threaten to 
                                                                                                                 
 
Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (2011) (“The fiduciary duties are routinely described 
as a duty of loyalty and a duty of care – as well as duties of candor, disclosure, and utmost 
good faith. . . . Most centrally, fiduciaries have a duty of loyalty which prohibits them from 
acting in a self-interested manner. The duty requires that fiduciaries act for the sole benefit of 
the beneficiary and prohibits their acting in any manner where their interests conflict with the 
interests of the beneficiary.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).  
 38. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 84–86; see also ALTERMAN, supra note 3, at 14 
(“Without public honesty, the process of voting becomes an exercise in manipulation rather 
than the expression of the consent of the governed. Many a scholar has persuasively argued 
that official deception may be convenient, but over time, it undermines the bond of trust 
between the government and the people that is essential to the functioning of a democracy.”); 
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 94 (“[H]iding botched policies can lead to further disasters 
down the road, not just because incompetents are usually kept in key leadership positions for 
at least some period of time, but also because engaging in cover-ups makes it difficult to have 
a national security system in which policymakers and military commanders are held 
accountable for their actions.”); Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May 
Legal Decision Makers Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1112 (2010) (“If citizens expect public 
officials to mislead them, they will become wary of arguments offered in public discourse.”).  
 39. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: 
Procedural Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 482, 483 (1995) (describing how individuals’ trust in leaders’ 
authority increases their willingness to comply with those leaders’ directives). 
 40. See Simon, supra note 6, at 458 (describing lies told by government officials as part 
of the Watergate cover-up as “particularly noxious because they were intended to subvert 
democratic processes of political accountability”). 
 41. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 835–42 
(2008) (arguing that common perceptions that law enforcement officers engage in deceit and 
other illegitimate behavior discourage public compliance with the law); Young, supra note 23, 
at 458–59 (“As knowledge of police lying spreads, trust of police will decrease and citizens 
will be less likely to come forward and talk honestly with police. Critical evidence may remain 
undiscovered or undisclosed.”); Jamie Masten, Note, “Ain’t No Snitches Ridin’ Wit’ Us”: How 
Deception in the Fourth Amendment Triggered the Stop Snitching Movement, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 
705, 708–09 (2009) (arguing that police deception has triggered public resistance to 
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undermine citizens’ faith in the legitimacy of the justice system and their willingness 
to rely upon and cooperate with it.42 In short, government lies can inflict the harms 
of disloyalty in ways that severely injure not only targeted individuals but also the 
broader public.  
B. The Challenges Posed by Efforts To Enforce Constraints on  
the Government’s Lies 
The range of substantial harms threatened by the government’s lies invites a 
search for ways to prevent and punish them. But efforts to enforce constraints on the 
government’s deliberate falsehoods can pose challenges and perhaps even dangers 
of their own. More specifically, such enforcement efforts trigger significant concerns 
about courts’ limited institutional competence, about undermining the separation of 
governmental powers, and about chilling government speakers’ willingness to 
engage in important expressive endeavors.  
1. Institutional Competence 
Even those deeply troubled by the potential dangers of government lies may 
remain skeptical of courts’ institutional competence to police them.43 As David 
Strauss explains,  
For the courts to enforce a prohibition against government lying or 
nondisclosure, they would have to make a delicate and complex inquiry 
into precisely what information was in the government’s possession. 
They would then have to determine the government’s reasons for the 
nondisclosure or false statements. . . . Institutional concerns, therefore, 
rather than any theoretical weakness, explain why the autonomy 
justification for the persuasion principle has not given rise to a judicially 
enforced first amendment prohibition against false statements by the 
                                                                                                                 
 
cooperation with the police). 
 42. See EMILY M. CALHOUN, LOSING TWICE 48 (2011) (“Citizens of full constitutional 
stature rightly recognize that, if justices do in fact lie to each other, they also necessarily lie to 
us. Citizens will also sense that acts of judicial untruthfulness can treat us as less than equal 
or as persons whose true consent does not matter to judicial legitimacy.”); Micah 
Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 991 (2008) (“Unless judges are sincere, 
the grounds for their decisions cannot be scrutinized in the public domain. And without such 
scrutiny, those subject to adjudication cannot determine whether the reasons given to them are 
sound.”). Paul Butler, on the other hand, is among those to argue that judicial lies are 
sometimes justified to thwart injustice. Paul Butler, When Judges Lie (and When They Should), 
91 MINN. L. REV. 1785, 1785–86 (2007) (“Sometimes [lying] is the best of the imperfect 
choices that judges have when they are confronted with unjust law. This Article recommends 
judicial lying only when it will thwart extreme injustice . . . .”). 
 43. See YUDOF, supra note 16, at 301 (“The danger that, in attempting to recalibrate 
communications networks, courts will create more problems than they solve is greatest when 
judicial intervention is greatest—when the courts rely on the Constitution to provide direct 
limits on government expression.”).  
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government or manipulative government failures to disclose 
information.44  
On the other hand, such challenges are not without precedent, as courts make 
similarly complex assessments of motive and falsity in a wide range of constitutional, 
statutory, and common law contexts.45 Constitutional doctrine, for example, 
frequently requires courts to identify and evaluate the motives underlying 
governmental decisions in a number of areas.46 In addition, as detailed by Gregory 
Klass, a wide-ranging “‘law of deception’” (that includes “the torts of deceit, 
negligent misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and defamation; criminal fraud statutes; 
[and] securities law, which includes both disclosure duties and penalties for false 
statements”) often calls upon courts to make a variety of similar determinations 
regarding falsity and intent.47 
2. Separation of Powers  
Reliance on constitutional litigation to constrain government’s deliberate 
falsehoods requires the judiciary to evaluate the policy choices of the politically 
accountable branches. Separation of powers concerns may thus leave judges 
themselves reluctant to enforce constitutional limitations on the government’s lies.48 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Strauss, supra note 12, at 359; see id. at 358–59 (“Specifically, prohibitions against 
government lying and manipulative government nondisclosure may be examples of a principle 
of free expression that is underenforced by the courts. Although the principles underlying the 
first amendment (under either the persuasion principle or the Meiklejohn theory) should 
prohibit government action of this kind, that is not a limitation that the courts can implement.” 
(footnote omitted)). That judges may themselves sometimes lie further compounds this 
challenge. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 45. For arguments rebutting institutional competence concerns in related contexts, see 
Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 914–16 (responding to separation of powers and judicial 
competence concerns about courts’ ability to police unlawful government secret keeping); D. 
Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 677 (2013) (describing 
public fiduciary theory as responsive to concerns about courts’ institutional competence to 
assess other governmental actors and observing that judges frequently enforce related 
fiduciary duties in the private law context). 
 46. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
710–21 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the search for impermissible government motive in equal 
protection doctrine). 
 47. Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 
449, 449 (2012); see also id. at 480–81 (noting that there are often good reasons to let judges 
and juries determine a message’s falsity and the speaker’s state of mind).  
 48. As Jonathan Varat observed:  
Nor, for example, if President Bush used erroneous information in making the 
case for going to war in Iraq, misleading those who were asked to support his 
policy, is it likely that a court would hold that the First Amendment itself required 
the president to issue a correction, or to be held liable for damages, even if it 
were proved that he knew he was making a false statement at the time.  
Varat, supra note 12, at 1133; see also Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U. L. 
REV. 1017, 1071 (2003) (“Underlying this judicial reluctance to find vindictiveness and 
selectivity, or even to give defendants the tools they might need to prove them, are real 
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Recall that in other contexts such concerns (along with concerns about judicial 
competence and the management of limited resources) have led courts to create and 
apply a variety of doctrines to narrow the circumstances under which the judiciary is 
empowered to second-guess the other branches; these include a range of 
governmental immunities,49 as well as standing, political question, and other 
justiciability doctrines.50 
These barriers, however, are not necessarily insuperable. As the Supreme Court 
has made clear,51 preserving the availability of the courts’ checking function is 
especially important when governments act in politically popular ways that 
nonetheless undermine key constitutional values (e.g., when a government seeks to 
punish or silence a politically weak or unpopular critic52) or when governments seek 
to entrench themselves in defiance of political controls (e.g., when the government 
seeks to manipulate election outcomes53). To this end, courts have recognized a 
variety of limits on and exceptions from the justiciability doctrines to help ensure 
that an independent judiciary remains available in appropriate circumstances to 
check the political branches.54 Some of the harms inflicted by the government’s lies 
are more individualized and targeted than others, for example, and are thus more 
likely to satisfy the requirements of standing doctrine.55 In addition, governmental 
immunities generally operate to bar only suits for money damages and not suits 
                                                                                                                 
 
concerns for the separation of powers . . . .”). 
 49. For example, the Court has held that certain functions are so key to effective 
government to require absolute immunity from money damages for government actors found 
to have violated the law when engaged in those functions. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 
219, 227–29 (1988) (discussing absolute immunity for judges performing certain judicial 
actions); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (holding that the President is absolutely 
immune from civil damages liability for his official acts). Even when engaged in functions 
that do not trigger absolute immunity, government actors found to have violated the 
Constitution may nevertheless enjoy “qualified immunity” from money damages so long as 
they did not violate law that was clearly established at the time and of which a reasonable 
person would have been aware. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). 
 50. E.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (ruling that a federal judge’s 
challenge to the Senate’s impeachment process was a nonjusticiable political question); City 
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (finding that the plaintiff had no standing to seek 
injunctive relief from the police department’s allegedly unconstitutional use of chokeholds 
because he could not show that he was imminently vulnerable to again being subjected to a 
chokehold). 
 51. E.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 52. E.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 897 (2012) 
(describing how the government sought to shut down the publication of leaked information by 
targeting pressure on the relatively unknown WikiLeaks rather than the more mainstream and 
powerful New York Times). 
 53. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down state legislatures’ refusal 
to reapportion state legislative districts to reflect major demographic changes as violation of 
Equal Protection Clause requirement of “‘one person, one vote’”). 
 54. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that equal protection challenge to 
states’ refusal to redistrict was not a political question and was thus justiciable).  
 55. See infra notes 159–160 and accompanying text for additional discussion of whether 
and when government lies inflict harms that would satisfy the requirements of standing 
doctrine. 
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seeking injunctive relief, and in certain circumstances even immunities from 
damages may be limited, waived, or otherwise overcome to achieve important public 
purposes.56  
3. Unintended Consequences: Chilling Valuable Government Speech 
Just as the government’s regulation of private speakers’ falsehoods may 
sometimes threaten to chill valuable speech,57 so too may be the case of efforts to 
regulate the government’s own lies. Indeed, measures that constrain government lies 
may chill both truthful government speech as well as certain beneficial government 
lies.58  
First, efforts to constrain government lies may chill government speakers in ways 
that deprive the public of accurate and thus valuable information. As Mark Yudof 
observed, requiring government to guarantee truth in its expression might inhibit it 
from performing important information-gathering and public-communication 
functions.59 One can easily imagine efforts by the government’s partisan political 
opponents or by those it has legitimately targeted for enforcement action to exploit 
constitutional litigation (or the threat thereof) to delay or squelch important 
government speech.60  
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. E.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (declining to find that prosecutor’s 
allegedly false statements made when announcing defendant’s indictment fell within zone of 
prosecutorial functions absolutely immune from damages liability). For extensive and 
thoughtful discussion of various immunities (and their exceptions) from liability for 
unconstitutional actions, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 
99 VA. L. REV. 207 (2013). 
 57. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“Although the erroneous 
statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free 
debate. . . . And punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise 
of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press.”); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282–83 (1964) (concluding that the imposition of damages liability 
for merely negligent false statements about public officials threatens to chill valuable political 
criticism).  
 58. Note that government speech can be valuable even if it is not constitutionally 
protected. Thus I do not claim that the government has a First Amendment right to its speech 
even as I note that its speech has value. 
 59. See YUDOF, supra note 16, at 46. In a decision most famous for its commerce clause 
ruling, the Supreme Court relied on related pragmatic grounds to reject a challenger’s efforts 
to invalidate the results of a referendum based on the Secretary of Agriculture’s allegedly 
misleading speech. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1942) (“To hold that a speech 
by a Cabinet officer, which failed to meet judicial ideals of clarity, precision, and 
exhaustiveness, may defeat a policy embodied in an Act of Congress, would invest 
communication between administrators and the people with perils heretofore unsuspected.”). 
 60. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 199–226 (expressing related concern that statutory 
prohibitions on lying to the government could be inappropriately enforced against government 
speakers by the government’s political enemies for political or other reasons); O’Reilly, supra 
note 30, at 546 (“A primary concern for regulators is to reduce the ability of an affected entity 
to prevent, remove, or mitigate the appearance of a piece of accurate data on the agency 
website or other information product concerning that entity. If [inaccurate government speech 
were actionable], there could be abuse of the new process by affected entities seeking delay or 
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We may thus fear that the prospect of litigation to enforce constitutional 
constraints on the government’s lies might deter some valuable government 
expression. Here too such concerns are substantial but not necessarily irrefutable. 
Recall that I have defined a “lie” for purposes of this Article to mean a false statement 
known by the speaker to be untrue and made with the intention that the listener 
understand it to be true. As the Court has acknowledged in related contexts, legal 
constraints that target only intentionally false factual assertions carry less potential 
for chilling valuable expression than do measures that sweep more broadly (for 
example, those that regulate speech on matters other than those that are demonstrably 
true or false or those that require speakers’ accuracy regardless of any culpable 
mental state).61 Moreover, as the Court has recognized in the context of commercial 
speech,62 chilling may be less of a concern with respect to speakers like the 
government that have strong incentives to continue to speak.  
Second, some government lies in certain contexts may have value in their own 
right, as can be the case of government’s deliberate falsehoods motivated by certain 
public purposes. Examples may include lies told to foil adversaries in times of war 
as well as the lies about their identities told by undercover police officers or civil 
rights enforcement testers seeking to identify and expose illegal behavior.63 Just as 
some lies by private speakers may be thought harmless or even helpful, so too may 
some lies by the government strike us as relatively innocuous or even valuable if they 
help accomplish important public objectives.64 Along these lines, many thinkers urge 
more generally that lies motivated by the speaker’s interest in preventing harm to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
agency silence about the violated conditions.”). 
 61. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (noting that “[t]he dangers of suppressing valuable ideas are lower where, as 
here, the regulations concern false statements about easily verifiable facts”); Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
at 277–82 (holding that the failure to require a showing of a speaker’s malice as an element of 
a defamation claim brought by a public official may chill valuable speech). 
 62. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
772 n.24 (1976) (“[C]ommercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since 
advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being 
chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely. Attributes such as these, the greater 
objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate 
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.” (emphasis in original)).  
 63. See Fair Housing Testing Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/fair-housing-testing-program-1 (last updated Aug. 6, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/8GMK-H6HS] (describing the Department of Justice’s Fair Housing Testing 
Program, in which “individuals who, without any bona fide intent to rent or purchase a home, 
apartment, or other dwelling, pose as prospective buyers or renters of real estate” to determine 
whether housing providers are complying with fair housing laws). 
 64. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“False factual 
statements can serve useful human objectives, for example: in social contexts, where they may 
prevent embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice, provide the sick with 
comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence; in public contexts, where they may stop a panic or 
otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger; and even in technical, philosophical, and 
scientific contexts, where (as Socrates’ methods suggest) examination of a false statement 
(even if made deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought that ultimately helps 
realize the truth.”).  
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listener (or others) are morally as well as instrumentally justifiable.65 John 
Mearsheimer is among those who see considerable benefit to certain strategically 
motivated government lies, such as those told to protect national security interests.66 
Kennedy administration Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester even 
proposed a governmental duty to lie in certain related circumstances:  
Government officials as individuals do not have the right to lie 
politically or to protect themselves, but they do always have the duty to 
protect their countrymen. . . . Sometimes, and those times are rare indeed, 
Government officials may be required to fulfill their duty by issuing a 
false statement to deceive a potential enemy, as in the Cuban missile 
crisis.67  
For these reasons, we may resist constraints on the government’s lies that are 
motivated by certain public-minded purposes.  
These concerns may be addressed by treating the government’s motive for lying 
as key to its decision’s ultimate legality. As discussed in more detail in Part IV, 
government lies that trigger strict constitutional scrutiny because they deprive their 
target of protected rights should fail this scrutiny when motivated by nonpublic (and 
thus noncompelling) reasons—for example, when the government has lied to protect 
itself from legal or political accountability, for its financial gain, or to silence or 
punish a critic’s protected expression. But the government’s decision should survive 
such scrutiny when necessary to achieve compelling government interests—for 
example, to calm public panic in a public safety emergency or to prevent a criminal 
from hurting a victim.68 
In sum, the government’s lies pose substantial dangers, as do efforts to prohibit 
them. Empowering government to protect us and our interests while limiting its 
ability to hurt us is no easy task, requiring care and attention to nuance. Wrestling 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. See BOK, supra note 19, at 78 (“Just as lies intended to avoid serious harm have often 
been thought more clearly excusable than others, so lies meant to do harm are often thought 
least excusable. And lies which neither avoid nor cause harm occupy the middle ground. 
Throughout the centuries, beginning with Augustine, such distinctions have been debated, 
refined, altered.” (emphasis in original)); Strauss, supra note 12, at 355 (“[T]here is a 
difference between lies that are manipulative and false statements made for different reasons. 
False statements that are not manipulative lack the element of control and domination. An 
inadvertently false statement, for example, or a false statement made solely for the purpose of 
protecting a confidence, is less objectionable because it does not involve the same degree of 
manipulation as a false statement made for the purpose of influencing behavior or thought.”).  
 66. MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 7; see also ALTERMAN, supra note 3, at 39 (“Lying 
about peaceful negotiations during wartime is a categorically different act than lying about 
warlike acts in peacetime, and far less troubling. Successful military operations often require 
secrecy and sometimes even deception.”).  
 67. Sylvester, supra note 10, at 14; see also MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 7 (“But the 
fact is that there are good strategic reasons for leaders to lie to their publics as well as to other 
countries. These practical logics almost always override well-known and widely accepted 
moral strictures against lying. Indeed, leaders sometimes think that they have a moral duty to 
lie to protect their country.”). 
 68. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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with the problem of government lies thus requires us to recognize, and seek to 
accommodate, these tensions. The next Part explores possible constitutional 
approaches to constraining government’s deliberate falsehoods that attend to these 
competing concerns. 
II. POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT LIES 
As the preceding Part described, the government’s lies threaten a range of serious 
harms. That government behaves badly, however, does not necessarily mean that it 
behaves unconstitutionally. This Part thus seeks to identify when and how the 
government’s lies inflict the harms of deception and breach of trust in ways that 
endanger specific constitutional rights.69 More specifically, it explores possibilities 
for building on due process and free speech theory and doctrine to address harms to 
targeted individuals while remaining attentive to the enforcement challenges 
described above.  
A. The Due Process Clause 
In this subpart, I propose that government lies violate the Due Process Clause 
when they directly deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property or when they are 
sufficiently coercive of their targets to constitute the functional equivalent of such 
deprivations. In other words, sometimes the government’s lies inflict the harms of 
deception in ways that injure their target’s protected liberty or property interests in 
legally cognizable ways. I further propose that even noncoercive government lies 
may violate the Due Process Clause in those extreme circumstances when they lack 
any reasonable justification—that is, when they shock the conscience with their 
outrageousness and thus constitute an abuse of governmental power. In other words, 
government lies that breach the public’s trust that its government’s actions will not 
be mean-spirited or cruel can also violate substantive due process protections.70 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. Although this Article focuses on the Due Process Clause and Free Speech Clause as 
the most promising sources of constitutional constraint on government lies, other possibilities 
remain. For example, Article II imposes upon the President an affirmative duty to speak that 
might be interpreted to include a duty to speak truthfully in that context. See Vasan Kesavan 
& J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 25 (2002) 
(interpreting Article II to require the President’s report on the state of the union to include 
“detailed reporting on the public affairs of the United States so that Congress may properly 
exercise its legislative power”); id. at 63–64 (“The publication of the President’s assessment 
conveys information to Congress—information uniquely gleaned from the President’s 
perspective in her various roles as Commander-in-Chief, chief law enforcer, negotiator with 
foreign powers, and the like—that shall aid the legislature in public deliberation . . . .”). 
Government lies designed to manipulate election results might also be understood to offend a 
commitment to a republican form of government in violation of the Guarantee Clause. See 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”). The Supreme Court, however, has long held that 
Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable political questions. E.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 
(7 How.) 1 (1849).  
 70. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (explaining that substantive due 
process protects against the arbitrary exercise of government power and thus “bar[s] certain 
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First, courts have already identified a few specific situations where the link 
between a government lie and the denial of constitutionally protected liberty is 
sufficiently strong to violate the Due Process Clause. As we know, the Constitution 
protects persons from governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.71 More specifically, government lies can violate procedural due 
process protections when they deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without 
adequate procedural safeguards, and they can violate substantive due process 
protections regardless of the presence of procedural safeguards when they deprive 
individuals of life, liberty, or property without adequate government justification.72 
For example, prosecutorial lies to a judge or jury can offend due process protections 
when they lead to a defendant’s conviction and thus the deprivation of her individual 
physical liberty.73 Other government lies that falsely assert an individual’s 
misconduct or dangerousness can deprive their targets of liberty in other very direct 
ways. Imagine, for example, a government’s lie that an individual is sufficiently 
dangerous to be included on a “no-fly” list and thus barred from international air 
travel.74  
The scope of such protections, of course, turns in great part on how broadly one 
defines protected liberty and property interests for purposes of the Due Process 
Clause. The examples identified in the preceding paragraph involve lies that are 
directly connected to what all agree are constitutionally protected interests in 
physical liberty. But other situations trigger considerably more controversy. 
Consider, for example, whether the Due Process Clause should be interpreted to 
constrain government’s defamatory lies75: although the causal connection between 
the government lie and damage to reputation is apparent, whether reputation itself is 
a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest remains contested.  
The Supreme Court considered this question in Paul v. Davis, where it rejected a 
procedural due process challenge to a local police department’s creation and 
distribution of a flyer that identified the challenger as one of several  
                                                                                                                 
 
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them”).  
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. 
 72. For a discussion of procedural and substantive due process principles more generally, 
see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, at 545–46. 
 73. See supra note 28 (listing examples).  
 74. See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1139 (D. Or. 2014) (noting conclusion 
in earlier order that plaintiffs had “protected liberty interests in their rights to travel 
internationally by air and rights to be free from false governmental stigmatization that were 
affected by their inclusion on the No-Fly List” and concluding that government’s failure to 
provide plaintiffs with post-deprivation notice or any meaningful opportunity to contest their 
inclusion on the no-fly list violated procedural due process protections); Aaron H. Caplan, 
Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (“Persons appearing on a 
blacklist [like the “no-fly” list] are not treated as suspected wrongdoers, but as confirmed 
wrongdoers who face consequences as a result. Yet these consequences are imposed without 
the procedures the U.S. Constitution ordinarily relies on to ensure that wrongdoers are 
correctly identified and punishment appropriately imposed.”). 
 75. For purposes of this discussion, I focus only on a subset of defamation—that is, 
defamatory lies—while recognizing that speech can sometimes constitute defamation if 
recklessly or negligently, and not only deliberately, false. 
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“Active Shoplifters,”76 even though the pending shoplifting charges against him had 
not been proven and were later dismissed.77 A divided Court held that government 
defamation does not trigger procedural due process protections (i.e., a name-clearing 
hearing) unless it causes some harm—like job loss or other economic injury—in 
addition to stigmatic injury.78 In dissent, Justice Brennan objected vigorously to the 
majority’s narrow understanding of the harm to liberty interests necessary to trigger 
procedural due process review and concluded that the “logical and disturbing 
corollary of this holding is that no due process infirmities would inhere in a statute 
constituting a commission to conduct ex parte trials of individuals, so long as the 
only official judgment pronounced was limited to the public condemnation and 
branding of a person . . . .”79  
The Court’s decision in Paul continues to attract criticism from those who would 
find both procedural and substantive Due Process Clause protections triggered by 
defamatory government lies that cause reputational damage alone.80 Barbara 
Armacost, for example, characterizes the Court’s holding as ignoring the unique 
reputational harms of government defamation, especially in the criminal context: 
“[B]ecause governmental officials have a virtual monopoly on criminal enforcement, 
the power to cause this kind of reputational harm is uniquely governmental. . . . The 
words and actions of police officers and prosecutors are viewed as official 
declarations of the law enforcement arms of government.”81 She describes the 
government’s defamatory assertion that an individual has engaged in criminal 
conduct as akin to an adjudication that should thus trigger procedural due process 
protections.82 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. See 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976).  
 77. Id. at 696. 
 78. Id. at 712 (holding that the government’s “defamatory publications, however 
seriously they may have harmed respondent’s reputation, did not deprive him of any ‘liberty’ 
or ‘property’ interests protected by the Due Process Clause”).  
 79. Id. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (italics in original).  
 80. See Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as 
Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 102, 142 (2009) (arguing that reputation should be 
protected as liberty for procedural due process purposes, especially in light of states’ growing 
ability to label citizens as “potential terrorists, gang members, sex offenders, child abusers, 
and prostitution patrons”); Randolph J. Haines, Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: 
The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. 191, 238–39 (1977) (urging a procedural due 
process analysis that addresses government defamation motivated by the government’s intent 
to stigmatize the target); Shaudee Navid, Comment, They’re Making a List, but Are They 
Checking It Twice? How Erroneous Placement on Child Offender Databases Offends 
Procedural Due Process, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1641, 1667–74 (2011) (describing circuit 
split as to whether the government’s erroneous listing of the plaintiff in a child offender 
database deprives him of a liberty interest and suggesting procedural cure with a system that 
permits timely correction of erroneous listings).  
 81. Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 569, 621–22 (1999).  
 82. Id. at 625 (“The distinction between statements that brand or accuse and those that 
simply report law enforcement actions would serve as a sensible limiting principle for the due 
process cause of action for governmental defamation.”). 
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Still others argue that government damage to reputation through defamatory lies 
infringes upon fundamental liberty or property interests in violation of substantive 
due process protections.83 The Court itself has explicitly declined to foreclose this 
possibility.84 Under this approach, regardless of the adequacy of any procedural 
protections, the government’s defamatory lies can violate the Due Process Clause 
when they lack an adequate justification.  
Consider next the possibility that the government’s lies that coerce its target into 
giving up protected liberties violate due process protections because they are 
functionally equivalent to directly depriving the target of those rights. Courts and 
commentators have extensively examined this possibility in the context of law 
enforcement officers’ lies.85 More specifically, when assessing whether police 
interrogators’ lies deprive their targets of constitutionally protected liberties, the 
Court seeks to determine whether the lies take the form of “coercion, not mere 
strategic deception,” such that they render a confession (or other decision to waive a 
constitutional right) involuntary.86  
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 
590–607 (1997) (arguing that government defamation should be understood as infringing a 
fundamental property interest in reputation and thus triggering strict scrutiny as a matter of 
substantive due process).  
 84. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711 n.5 (“Our discussion in Part III is limited to consideration of 
the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause and is not intended to describe those 
substantive limitations upon state action which may be encompassed within the concept of 
‘liberty’ expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Recently, the Court suggested that 
substantive due process guarantees might apply to the government’s defamatory lies. See 
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 9 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (“I join the 
Court’s opinion and agree with the observation that today’s holding does not foreclose a claim 
that Connecticut’s dissemination of registry information is actionable on a substantive due 
process principle. To the extent that libel might be at least a component of such a claim, our 
reference to Connecticut’s disclaimer would not stand in the way of a substantive due process 
plaintiff.” (citation omitted)). 
 85. See Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1174 (2001) (“Interrogation typically requires at least some 
deception—from professing unfelt sympathy for the suspect, to exaggerating the strength of 
the evidence against the suspect, to falsely alleging that a witness has identified the suspect.”). 
Although such interrogation lies can offer considerable benefits in uncovering, punishing, and 
preventing wrongdoing and protecting public safety, they also threaten significant harm 
through wrongful convictions and decreased public trust. Debate abounds on the comparative 
costs and benefits of police lies. Compare id. at 1171–72 (urging that limiting police deception 
would impose significant societal harm by reducing the number of convictions of the guilty), 
and William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 
1907 (1993) (“[G]uilty criminal defendants would benefit substantially if the law were to 
prohibit deceptive tactics, while innocents would probably be harmed by the impairment of 
the government’s ability to sort cases.”), with Young, supra note 23 (arguing that police lies 
are unacceptably harmful), and Irina Khasin, Note, Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Case for the 
Limitation of Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices in the United States, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1029, 1032 (2009) (“Confessions gained through police deception are often 
factually inaccurate and untrustworthy.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (finding no constitutional violation 
when an undercover law enforcement officer posed as a fellow inmate to whom a jailed suspect 
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This focus on coercion seeks to protect individuals’ liberty to decide freely 
whether to waive a constitutional right (such as the right to be free from compelled 
self-incrimination, the right to a lawyer, or the right to be free from warrantless 
searches) while also declining to characterize all police lies as rising to the level of a 
constitutional violation.87 Here the hard questions center on the causal connection 
between the lie and a constitutionally protected liberty—that is, whether and when 
the government’s lie is sufficiently coercive such that it effectively deprives an 
individual of that right. In assessing whether law enforcement officers’ lies are 
impermissibly coercive, courts often try to determine whether their target could 
reasonably be expected to resist them with silence rather than with an incriminating 
response or other waiver of a constitutional right. Along these lines, Christopher 
Slobogin has synthesized the case law to identify two types of interrogation lies as 
“clearly illegitimately coercive.”88 First, police lies about the target’s constitutional 
rights coerce the waiver of such rights and thus violate constitutional protections.89 
In other words, the government’s lies about the existence of, or the consequences of 
exercising, constitutional rights can be the practical equivalent of its refusal to honor 
those rights altogether. Second, courts often characterize lies as coercive if they 
would be coercive if true—that is, if a reasonable person would likely waive a 
constitutional right in response.90 Examples of such lies include false threats to take 
a suspect’s child away or false threats to cut off government financial aid to a 
suspect’s child unless the suspect waived her rights,91 and false claims that doctors 
trying to save a child’s life needed a suspect’s explanation of the circumstances under 
which he injured the child.92 Such lies’ coercive potential may vary with the audience 
as well as with subject matter and other contextual factors: for example, a number of 
commentators assert that teenagers’ youth and inexperience leaves them especially 
vulnerable to police interrogation tactics that include lies.93 
                                                                                                                 
 
made damaging admissions); id. at 297 (“Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic 
deception by taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow 
prisoner.”); United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408 (1st Cir. 1998) (“But trickery is not 
automatically coercion. Indeed, the police commonly engage in such ruses as suggesting to a 
suspect that a confederate has just confessed or that police have or will secure physical 
evidence against the suspect. While the line between ruse and coercion is sometimes blurred, 
confessions procured by deceits have been held voluntary in a number of situations.”); see 
also GREEN, supra note 27, at 93–95 (distinguishing the harms of coercion and deception as 
different ways to bend another’s will against her own preferences—the first through force or 
power and the second through the manipulation of information).  
 87. Many commentators have addressed more generally how courts fashion constitutional 
law doctrine to accommodate the institutional realities of various government actors. See, e.g., 
Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 
422 (2012); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 
(1988). 
 88. Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1275, 1276 
(2007). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963). 
 92. See People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 314–15 (N.Y. 2014). 
 93. See Hayley M. D. Cleary, Police Interviewing and Interrogation of Juvenile Suspects: 
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In contrast, examples of law enforcement officers’ lies that courts generally 
characterize as noncoercive include police lies about the strength of their case (e.g., 
whether a codefendant has confessed or whether there’s a witness), lies about the 
existence of physical evidence, lies about the comparative blameworthiness of the 
defendant’s or the victim’s conduct, lies about the circumstances of the interrogation 
(e.g., the identity of the interrogator or the results of a polygraph test), and lies by 
undercover officers about their identities in noncustodial settings.94 Here courts 
generally find such lies noncoercive because they believe a reasonable person could 
resist them simply by remaining silent or otherwise declining to waive a 
constitutional right. Civil rights testers’ intentional misrepresentations about their 
interest in buying or renting specific property to determine whether housing 
providers are complying with fair housing laws should similarly be characterized as 
noncoercive, as the target is free to respond (or not to respond) in any of a variety of 
ways (other than waiving constitutional rights).95 
Courts’ assessments of the constitutionality of police lies to secure consent to 
search without a warrant similarly turn on whether they find the lie to be coercive.96 
The Supreme Court, for example, has found a suspect’s consent to be involuntary 
when given in response to law enforcement officers’ intentionally false claim that 
they had a warrant.97 In contrast, the Court has held that an undercover officer’s lie 
about his identity did not render involuntary the suspect’s invitation of that 
undercover agent into his home for a drug sale.98  
To be sure, the line between coercive lies and those that are instead “merely” 
deceptive is far from bright. Just as philosophers have long disagreed over the 
meaning of coercion, so too have courts and legal commentators.99 Justices Marshall 
                                                                                                                 
 
A Descriptive Examination of Actual Cases, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2014) 
(documenting ways in which teenagers may be particularly vulnerable to police coercion due 
to their youth and inexperience); Errol C. Dauis, Note, Police Trickery and Juvenile Suspects: 
People v. Mays, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 205 (2011) (arguing that juveniles are 
especially vulnerable to police coercion because of their youth and inexperience); Patrick M. 
McMullen, Comment, Questioning the Questions: The Impermissibility of Police Deception 
in Interrogations of Juveniles, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 971, 975–76 (2005) (proposing bright-line 
ban on police deception when interrogating juveniles in light of juveniles’ greater vulnerability 
to coercion, greater deference to authority, and limited ability to assess consequences). 
 94. Young, supra note 23, at 429–33.  
 95. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 96. William E. Underwood, Note, A Little White Lie: The Dangers of Allowing Police 
Officers to Stretch the Truth As a Means to Gain a Suspect’s Consent to Search, 18 WASH. & 
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 167 (2011) (describing police lies about the reasons for a search 
when requesting consent to search without a warrant); id. at 177 (explaining that consents to 
searches must be free of coercion to be voluntary within meaning of Fourth Amendment).  
 97. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (finding that consent to search 
was not voluntary when given in response to law enforcement officers’ false claim that they 
had a warrant). 
 98. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966). 
 99. See J. Roland Pennock, Coercion: An Overview, in COERCION 1 (J. Roland Pennock 
& John W. Chapman eds., 1972) (describing philosophers’ debates over the definition of 
coercion). The Supreme Court itself has defined coercion differently in different settings, and 
is considerably quicker to find government’s actions to be coercive in some areas than in 
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and Stevens, for example, are among those to have urged the Court to recognize a 
substantially broader range of police lies as unconstitutionally coercive. More 
specifically, Justice Marshall vigorously contested the Court’s refusal to characterize 
as coercive an undercover officer’s lies to a suspect in custody; he urged that any 
custodial questioning is inherently coercive, regardless of whether the target 
perceives the questioner as the police.100 Justice Stevens similarly objected to the 
Court’s refusal to characterize as coercive law enforcement officers’ deliberately 
false assurances to an attorney that they were not questioning his client; he argued 
that such lies are the functional equivalent of refusing to allow a suspect to consult 
with his attorney in violation of the right to counsel.101 Various state and federal 
courts have also developed different measures of coercion when assessing the 
constitutionality of police lies.102 
One could thus plausibly argue that a focus on coercion as a touchstone for due 
process analysis lacks conceptual coherence or normative appeal or both,103 as it not 
only invites contested determinations of whether a government lie is coercive but also 
may fail to capture the full range of ways in which even noncoercive government lies 
can nonetheless inflict harm.104 But the conceptually coherent alternatives—that is, 
that we should interpret the Constitution to prohibit all of the government’s lies, or 
none—are even less appealing from a normative standpoint: they either punish 
harmless and even beneficial government lies, or they insulate some deeply damaging 
government lies from constraint. Here I do not seek to resolve the limitations of 
coercion-based analysis; instead I simply propose that government lies in certain 
contexts can coerce their targets in ways that we should recognize as depriving 
individuals of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. As we have seen, the 
challenges posed by the government’s lies demand attention to context; attention to 
context, in turn, requires us to tolerate—and perhaps even embrace—some 
indeterminacy.105 For these reasons, I suggest that coercion provides a helpful, if 
                                                                                                                 
 
others. E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Buss. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012) 
(describing federal government’s “threats to terminate other significant independent grants” 
as coercive of state policy); id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding no such coercion); 
see also infra notes 139–143 and accompanying text (discussing Justices’ differing approaches 
to coercion in the context of Establishment Clause analysis). 
 100. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 306 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The 
compulsion proscribed by Miranda includes deception by the police.”). 
 101. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 450–56 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 102. See Young, supra note 23, at 453–56. 
 103. See Pierre Schlag, The Legal Argument Toolkit 13–18 (Jan. 1, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (identifying conceptual intelligibility and 
normative appeal as among the criteria for “sound” legal distinctions). As Schlag points out, 
these criteria stand in some tension with each other, which makes ideal legal distinctions 
elusive. Id. at 19–20. 
 104. See Young, supra note 23, at 456–71 (arguing that even noncoercive lies by police 
pose unacceptable harms to their ability to gather evidence and to their integrity). 
 105. See Schlag, supra note 103, at 34–35 (observing that indeterminacy has a number of 
virtues, including maintaining flexibility, accommodating future change, postponing decision 
making, and deferring to other decision makers). In a related context, Toni Massaro has 
extolled the virtues of constitutional thinking “that is factored, not formulaic; contextual, not 
trans-contextual; dynamic, not static; tentative, not absolutist; plural, not singular.” Toni M. 
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imperfect, touchstone for identifying the universe of government lies that we should 
understand to violate the Due Process Clause. 
We can build upon this analysis to identify circumstances outside of the law 
enforcement context in which government lies may operate coercively to deprive 
individuals of constitutionally protected rights. For example, some government lies 
about voting matters can violate the Due Process Clause.106 More specifically, the 
government’s lies about the location of polls or the times at which they close can 
deprive individuals of the meaningful exercise of voting rights. So too may be the 
case of the government’s lies about candidates’ identity or party affiliation.107 
As another example, the Supreme Court has suggested that laws subjecting 
women seeking abortions to the government’s inaccurate or misleading speech about 
abortion—presumably including, but not limited to, government lies about the legal 
or health consequences of abortion—can pose an impermissible undue burden to a 
woman’s reproductive rights.108 Although to date courts’ discussion of this 
possibility has been very cursory, we might understand such lies as coercive of 
women’s reproductive choices. Indeed, the Court has suggested in other contexts that 
women seeking abortions at health care facilities can be considered “‘captive’ by 
medical circumstance[s]” (i.e., with limited possibilities for exit or rebuttal)109—a 
dynamic that increases the potential for coercion. The coercive effects of such lies 
may also increase if the government requires that they be uttered by health care 
providers upon whom patients rely for trusted and expert advice.110 Again, listeners’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 367 (2014).  
 106. See Caruso v. Yamhill Cnty., 422 F.3d 848, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2005) (raising the 
possibility that false ballot speech could violate the Due Process Clause while finding that the 
contested ballot speech was not misleading); McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 
65 F.3d 1215, 1227 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).  
 107. See Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098, 1102–03 (7th Cir. 1973) (finding possible due 
process violation when state election officials issued ballot that intentionally misidentified a 
sham candidate as the nominee, when the sham candidate quickly resigned and was replaced 
by government officials’ preferred candidate). 
 108. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (“If the 
information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not 
misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”); see also Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., 
S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 898–99 (8th Cir. 2012) (debating whether government-required 
statements that women who obtain abortions experience increased risk of suicide and suicide 
ideation were truthful and not misleading and thus consistent with substantive due process). 
 109. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (“[W]hile 
targeted picketing of the home threatens the psychological well-being of the ‘captive’ resident, 
targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but also the 
physical, well-being of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical circumstance.”). For related 
discussion, see Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled 
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 941 (2009); Nadia N. Sawicki, Compelling Images: The 
Constitutionality of Emotionally Persuasive Health Campaigns, 73 MD. L. REV. 458, 516–20 
(2014). 
 110. As a number of commentators have observed, patients might well misunderstand 
health care professionals to be offering their own independent counsel rather than speaking 
from the government’s required script. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE 
L.J. 151, 172–75 (1996) (arguing that patients could mistakenly attribute the government’s 
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ability to resist, and thus lies’ potential to coerce, varies with audience and setting, 
and some government lies in such circumstances should be considered sufficiently 
coercive of liberty to violate the Due Process Clause. 
Consider finally the possibility that, under certain extreme circumstances, even 
non-coercive lies by the government may violate substantive due process protections 
against especially outrageous exercises of governmental power.111 As the Court has 
explained, “Since the time of our early explanations of due process, we have 
understood the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary action . . . . [i.e.,] 
the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a 
legitimate governmental objective . . . .”112 As its test for determining whether 
executive branch action violates such substantive due process protections, the Court 
has considered whether “the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so 
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.”113 The 
government’s motive is key to this inquiry: “[C]onduct intended to injure in some 
way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely 
to rise to the conscience-shocking level.”114 Also relevant to this determination is “an 
understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the 
standards of blame generally applied to them.”115  
The shocks-the-conscience test thus seeks to capture our expectations—enforceable 
as a constitutional matter under the Due Process Clause—that our government should 
not behave outrageously in its dealings with us. This expectation can be frustrated by 
government lies (or other conduct) that reflects unusually culpable exercises of 
government power. For example, while declining to find that police officers’ deliberate 
falsehoods to a suspect’s attorney about their plans to question his client shocked the 
conscience in violation of due process, the Court nonetheless noted: “We do not 
question that on facts more egregious than those presented here police deception might 
rise to a level of a due process violation.”116 
To date, however, courts have very rarely applied the shocks-the-conscience test 
of government outrageousness to constrain government action of any sort—and even 
then most often to constrain physical abuse by law enforcement officers117 rather 
than their lies.118 On the one hand, the test’s subjectivity has triggered its share of 
                                                                                                                 
 
views to their doctors).  
 111. I am grateful to Toni Massaro for this suggestion.  
 112. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998). 
 113. Id. at 848 n.8; see also id. at 846 (“[F]or half a century now we have spoken of the 
cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.”). 
 114. Id. at 849. In Lewis, the Court found that a police officer’s allegedly reckless high-speed 
pursuit of two teens that resulted in one’s death did not shock the conscience because it was 
spontaneous rather than deliberate and did not involve an intent to cause harm. Id. at 854–55. 
 115. Id. at 848 n.8. 
 116. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986). 
 117. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that sheriff’s 
direction to hospital doctor to pump suspect’s stomach, against suspect’s will, to retrieve 
evidence was sufficiently outrageous to violate substantive due process protections).  
 118. E.g., Tinker v. Beasley, 429 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that police 
officers’ lies to suspect that her lawyer had abandoned her did not shock the conscience); 
Livsey v. Salt Lake Cnty., 275 F.3d 952, 957–58 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that police officer’s 
misrepresentations of victim’s private sexual behavior did not shock the conscience); see also 
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criticism, and courts may thus be reluctant to invoke it.119 On the other hand, Jane 
Bambauer and Toni Massaro, after extensively reviewing the history of the 
shocks-the-conscience test, found that “the problems anticipated by critics are more 
theoretical than actual” and concluded that the test is no more subjective than tort 
law and that judges have been appropriately restrained in applying it.120  
Indeed, courts not uncommonly assess the outrageousness of lies (and other 
behavior) in other contexts—for example, in determining whether conduct satisfies 
the outrageousness element of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.121 
In these other contexts, courts rely on a number of factors, considering not only the 
liar’s malicious intent to injure, but also (and relatedly) whether she abused a position 
of authority, whether her conduct was repeated rather than isolated, and whether she 
knew her target to be especially vulnerable.122 Some lies by the government abuse 
                                                                                                                 
 
United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 408–09 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[T]he police can often mislead 
suspects, at least where coercion is not involved; thus, it is impossible to treat all such false 
statements as improper, let alone outrageous or uncivilized. Police investigation can be a rough 
business, and untruths may sometimes be necessary to save a kidnap victim, retrieve a missing 
firearm, or for other reasons quite apart from the desire to solve a specific crime already 
committed.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Lewis, 523 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing the 
shocks-the-conscience test as the “ne plus ultra, the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, 
the Cellophane of subjectivity” (italics in original) (footnote omitted)); Eric L. Muller, 
Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1045 (2003) (“[The shocks-the-conscience 
test] persists as a constitutional test without shape or content, and its critics mock it for its 
subjectivity.”). For arguments that the shocks-the-conscience test is insufficiently restrictive 
of governmental power, see Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience 
Test, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 307, 308 (2010) (describing lower courts as having interpreted the test 
“to impose a draconian standard, mandating, for example, that detainees demonstrate 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or that students prove intentional malice or sadism 
in order to challenge excessive, unwarranted corporal punishment”). 
 120. Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583926 [http://perma.cc/K79F-7ZND]; see also Rochin, 342 U.S. 
at 169 (“In dealing not with the machinery of government but with human rights, the absence 
of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable 
attribute of constitutional provisions.”); Bambauer & Massaro, supra, at 7 (“Too much 
skepticism deprives us of a valuable judicial resource. We therefore advocate for (carefully) 
increased use of outrageousness and irrationality scrutiny to allow liberty claims to develop 
organically, cautiously, and contextually.”). 
 121. This tort has its critics as well. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum 
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 51 (1982) (“The term ‘outrageous’ is neither 
value-free nor exacting. It does not objectively describe an act or series of acts; rather, it 
represents an evaluation of behavior. The concept thus fails to provide clear guidance either 
to those whose conduct it purports to regulate, or to those who must evaluate that conduct.”).  
 122. See Kelly v. Gen. Tel. Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. 184, 188 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that 
supervisor’s false claims that former employee misused company funds and falsified invoices 
were outrageous); Turnage v. Kasper, 704 S.E.2d 842, 852–53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding 
that false accusations that neighbor violated bond conditions, which resulted in neighbor’s 
arrest, were outrageous); Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) 
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its power in ways that satisfy such tests of outrageousness. One federal court, for 
example, found that law enforcement conduct shocked the conscience when police, 
among other things, misrepresented that they had a warrant to extract drugs 
involuntarily from a suspect’s vagina such that she then extracted them herself.123 
And three Ninth Circuit judges recently urged in dissent that law enforcement 
officers’ lies rose to the level of outrageousness when they recruited random targets 
to commit a fictional crime (robbing a drug house that did not exist) for which the 
targets were prosecuted and convicted.124  
In sum, some government lies inflict the harms of deception in ways that endanger 
specific individual liberties protected by the Due Process Clause. Examples include 
prosecutors’ lies to judges and juries that lead to a defendant’s imprisonment; law 
enforcement officers’ lies that coerce the involuntary waiver of constitutional rights; 
and government lies that deprive their targets of the ability meaningfully to exercise 
voting, reproductive, or other protected liberties. Some government lies can also 
violate the Due Process Clause by breaching the public’s trust that its government 
will not behave outrageously; examples include the government’s lies that lack any 
reasonable justification—that is, that shock our conscience—and thus constitute an 
abuse of governmental power.  
B. The Free Speech Clause 
This subpart explores when, if ever, the government’s lies sufficiently injure First 
Amendment interests to justify a departure from the general rule that the 
government’s own speech is insulated from Free Speech Clause review. The 
Supreme Court has recognized a “government speech” defense to certain Free 
Speech Clause claims, holding that private speakers generally have no First 
Amendment right to silence or alter the government’s own expression.125 The Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
(holding that false accusations of battery to gain leverage in child custody proceedings could 
support a finding of outrageousness); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d, cmt. e 
(1965) (identifying, as examples of outrageous conduct, lies that the target’s husband had been 
seriously injured and lies that one is a police officer to coerce the target’s behavior).  
 123. United States v. Anderson, No. 5:13-cr-24, 2013 WL 5769976, at *12 (D. Vt. Oct. 24, 
2013), rev’d on other grounds, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 124. See United States v. Black, 750 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (“While trolling in a bar, the paid CI [confidential informant] successfully tempted 
a randomly-selected person to participate in the (fictional) crime by offering him the 
opportunity to obtain a huge financial benefit. After the CI put the participant in touch with 
the government agent, the agent urged the participant to bring others into the plot, played the 
principal role in devising and executing the imaginary crime, and then walked the defendants 
through a script that ensured lengthy prison sentences for committing a crime that did not 
exist.”); United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 318 (9th Cir. 2013) (Noonan, J., dissenting) 
(“Massively involved in the manufacture of the crime, the ATF’s actions constitute conduct 
disgraceful to the federal government. It is not a function of our government to entice into 
criminal activity unsuspecting people engaged in lawful conduct; not a function to invent a 
fiction in order to bait a trap for the innocent; not a function to collect conspirators to carry 
out a script written by the government.”). 
 125. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (explaining that the 
government’s own speech is exempt from Free Speech Clause scrutiny); see also Pleasant 
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recognition of the government speech defense provides not that government has a 
First Amendment right, but instead a privilege, to its own speech.126 In recognizing 
such a defense, however, the Court so far has emphasized the ubiquity and 
importance of the government’s expression without yet addressing its potential 
threats to constitutional values; the only exception to date, as discussed below, is the 
Court’s willingness to interpret the Establishment Clause to constrain government’s 
religious speech under some circumstances.127 This subpart thus considers whether 
and when some government lies are sufficiently coercive of their targets’ beliefs or 
speech to constitute the functional equivalent of the government’s direct regulation 
of those expressive choices in violation of the Free Speech Clause. 
The government’s deliberately false speech can undermine key First Amendment 
values in furthering participation in democratic self-governance, facilitating the 
exercise of individual autonomy, and fostering the discovery of truth and the 
dissemination of knowledge.128 First, many government lies frustrate democratic 
self-governance.129 The Supreme Court has noted that political lies by private 
                                                                                                                 
 
Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“If [public entities] were engaging in their 
own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application. The Free Speech 
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government 
speech.”). 
 126. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913) (“A right is one’s affirmative claim against 
another, and a privilege is one’s freedom from the right or claim of another.”); Frederick 
Schauer, Hohfeld’s First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 914, 914 (2008) (“Existing First 
Amendment doctrine takes a rather clear position with respect to the Hohfeldian structure: a 
First Amendment right is a right against the government and only against the government.”). 
 127. See Mary Jean Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment 
Clause Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 24 (2010) (“[A] large 
proportion of all Establishment Clause jurisprudence could be thought of as involving claims 
about government religious speech, with the other broad category relating to government 
aid.”). A number of commentators have investigated the potential harms of government speech 
in other contexts and have proposed various approaches for addressing those concerns. See, 
e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling 
Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, 
Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005); Helen Norton, The 
Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008); 
Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648 (2013). 
 128. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 6 (2012) (summarizing and describing 
the three major proposed purposes of the First Amendment as “cognitive” (“‘advancing 
knowledge and discovering truth’” (quoting THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970))); “ethical” (furthering individual autonomy and self-fulfillment); and 
“political” (“facilitating the communicative processes necessary for successful democratic 
self-governance”)); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 
CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (describing the key values underlying the First Amendment’s 
protection of speech to include furthering democratic self-governance, enabling the exercise 
of individual autonomy, and facilitating the discovery of truth and the dissemination of 
knowledge). 
 129. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
2015] THE GOVERNMENT’S LIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 101 
 
speakers can offend such a Meiklejohnian view of the Free Speech Clause;130 lies by 
the government carry even greater potential to undermine this interest. Consider, for 
example, a government’s lies that hide its wrongdoing and thus stymie the public’s 
ability to hold elected officials politically accountable for their misconduct, or that 
deliberately manipulate policymakers’—and the public’s—assessments of competing 
policy options.131 Moreover, government lies pose especially grave instrumental 
threats to democratic self-governance in contexts where such deliberate falsehoods are 
unlikely to be addressed by counterspeech, as can be the case with government lies 
about information to which it has near-monopoly access, such as national security and 
intelligence matters.132 Just as a government’s criminal sanction or economic reprisal 
intended to punish or silence those who seek to expose its wrongdoing clearly 
undermine democratic self-governance, so too can be the case of government lies 
designed to prevent or deter such exposure.  
Second, some lies by the government seek to manipulate individual listeners’ 
beliefs and decisions in ways that undermine those listeners’ autonomy and dignity. 
As Jonathan Varat, for example, explains, “[T]he most powerful argument in favor 
of government authority to restrict deception, and the most powerful argument 
against government-imposed deception, are the same: the manipulative, 
domineering, and fundamentally disrespectful invasion of autonomy worked by 
deception.”133 Just as government laws that require or prohibit certain beliefs 
                                                                                                                 
 
24–25 (1948) (characterizing expression as furthering First Amendment values when it 
contributes to democratic self-governance); id. at 27 (“It is that mutilation of the thinking 
process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.” 
(emphasis omitted)).  
 130. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (“That speech is used as a tool for 
political ends does not automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution. 
For the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic 
government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to 
be effected.”). 
 131. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 93 (“[W]henever leaders cannot sell a policy to 
their public in a rational-legal manner, there is a good chance that the problem is with the 
policy, not the audience.”); Spottswood, supra note 20, at 1253 (“Insincere assertions do not 
further our interest in governing ourselves through a free and open exchange of information 
and ideas, because they involve the betrayal of the public interest, not argument made in 
service of it.”); Strauss, supra note 12, at 358 (“[F]alse statements by the government . . . can 
seriously hamper the discussion necessary for democratic self-government that, according to 
the Meiklejohn theory, the first amendment was designed to protect.”).  
 132. See Jacobs, supra note 26, at 444 (“[President Bush] and his top officials relied on 
controlled information release in a number of ways to support their use of force advocacy. 
That they withheld much information within their control meant that they could rely upon the 
public’s knowledge that they had superior access to the entire body of existing information to 
characterize the facts with greater certainty than the content of the information reflected, to 
omit mention of dissent, to suggest that they had more and better quality information than they 
presented, and to ask the public to embrace the truth of the threat claims based on trust rather 
than proof.”).  
 133. Varat, supra note 12, at 1110; see also Strauss, supra note 12, at 358 (“[W]hen the 
government makes false statements or fails to disclose information for the purpose of 
manipulating its own citizens, its conduct is wrong . . . .”); id. at 358 n.67 (“It might be thought 
that the reason the courts do not enforce a prohibition against government lying is that the 
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undermine individual autonomy, so too may be the case of government lies that 
manipulate their listeners into adopting beliefs or expression of the government’s 
choice. Such government lies can be especially effective in manipulating listeners 
when directed to a vulnerable or captive audience where neither exit nor rebuttal is a 
meaningful option, as can be the case of government lies to those in custody or to 
young children in public schools.134  
Third, government lies can frustrate the search for truth and the dissemination of 
knowledge.135 Again, this may be especially true with respect to scientific or national 
security matters where the government has unusual expertise or selective access to 
the information in question, thus limiting meaningful opportunities for 
counterspeech.136 Just as government efforts to prohibit the expression of certain 
views contrary to its own can undermine First Amendment enlightenment values, so 
too can be the case of government lies that successfully distort public discussion of 
a particular matter or viewpoint.  
Government lies can thus deceive their targets in a number of ways that undermine 
free speech values. Interpreting the Free Speech Clause actually to prohibit such lies, 
however, requires some refinement of current doctrine, as courts and commentators 
have yet to grapple with the specific question of whether and when such lies should 
be understood to “abridg[e] the freedom of speech.”137 In other words, government 
lies raise challenging First Amendment problems in large part because they do not 
involve the traditional exercise of state power (unlike, for example, statutes that 
criminalize or otherwise penalize private parties’ speech).  
Government lies that coerce expressive activity may constitute the sort of “hard 
law” that generally triggers constitutional scrutiny.138 As discussed in the preceding 
                                                                                                                 
 
language of the first amendment does not authorize such a prohibition. But as a matter of 
language it is not implausible to say that the government ‘abridg[es] the freedom of speech’ 
when it deliberately lies about a matter of great public concern for the purpose of preventing 
a full public debate.” (alteration in original)).  
 134. See Jeffrey M. Cohen, The Right to Learn: Intellectual Honesty and the First 
Amendment, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 659, 683 (2012) (urging that students have a First 
Amendment right to learn that includes the right to “honest, deceit-free” compulsory 
education). 
 135. Varat, supra note 12, at 1132 (“By its nature, government deception impairs the 
enlightenment function of the First Amendment, limiting the citizenry’s capacity to check 
government abuse and participate in self-governance to the maximum extent.”). 
 136. See Jess Alderman, Words to Live By: Public Health, the First Amendment, and 
Government Speech, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 161, 164 (2009) (“Scientific information can be 
particularly difficult for listeners to evaluate, so they will turn to sources they trust for 
information. Because the government is empowered to regulate and promote health, can 
expend vast resources, and has historically played a central role in the promotion of health, 
government speech has a uniquely powerful influence on public health.”). 
 137. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 138. A number of scholars focus on what they characterize as the presence or absence of 
the government’s coercion to distinguish more generally between what they call “hard” and 
“soft” law. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 129 (2015) (“[L]aw is coercive 
to the extent that its sanctions provide motivations for people, because of the law, to do 
something other than what they would have done absent the law; and . . . law can be said to 
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subpart, government lies that coerce targets’ decisions about whether to exercise 
constitutionally protected liberties are hard to distinguish from government actions 
that deny those rights altogether, and thus as a functional matter can be understood 
to deprive individual liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. This subpart 
similarly proposes that we understand the Free Speech Clause to constrain the 
government’s lies that are sufficiently coercive of expressive activity to be the 
functional equivalent of regulating that expression directly. Along these lines, Toni 
Massaro has urged that we understand government speech more generally to violate 
the First Amendment when it “exerts so much expressive power that its actions are 
tantamount to direct speech regulation.”139 Applying this suggestion specifically to 
the government’s deliberate falsehoods, we can understand the government’s lies to 
exert expressive power in this way when they coerce targets’ beliefs or expression. 
Indeed, courts already consider the coercive potential of the government’s speech 
when determining whether government has violated the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause. More specifically, courts sometimes find government’s 
religious speech to violate the Establishment Clause when such expression coerces 
its listeners’ choices.140 To be sure, divisions remain even among advocates of 
coercion theory about whether and when government’s religious speech alone can 
coerce behavior.141 Justice Kennedy, for example, has defined impermissible 
                                                                                                                 
 
exercise compulsion when its coercive force actually does induce the aforesaid shift in 
behavior.”); Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 721 (2012) (“Hard 
power is, quite simply, ‘the ability to coerce.’. . . Soft power, by contrast, is ‘the ability to get 
what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.’” (quoting Joseph S. Nye, 
Jr., Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 256 (2004))); Jacob E. 
Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
573, 577 (2008) (defining “soft law” to include statements by lawmaking authorities that do 
not have legally coercive status—that is, those statements “that do not have the force of law”). 
To be sure, however, a number of thoughtful commentators contest such distinctions as 
meaningless, instead urging that all government action is coercive. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, 
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471–74 
(1923) (arguing that because private actors can assert coercive power just as government can, 
government’s choice to leave certain matters to background law rather than to public 
regulation simply creates opportunities for coercion by private actors; government, thus, 
always distributes coercion in different ways rather than coercing or refraining from coercion). 
 139. Massaro, supra note 105, at 402 (emphasis omitted); see also Meese v. Keene, 481 
U.S. 465, 490 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court takes an unjustifiably narrow 
view of the sort of government action that can violate First Amendment protections. . . . 
[T]here need not be a direct restriction of speech in order to have a First Amendment 
violation.”); id. at 490–91 (“The Court has recognized that indirect discouragements are fully 
capable of a coercive effect on speech, and that the First Amendment protections extend 
beyond the blatant censorship the Court finds lacking here.” (citation omitted)).  
 140. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659–60 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[G]overnment may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise . . . . Forbidden involvements 
include compelling or coercing participation or attendance at a religious activity, requiring 
religious oaths to obtain government office or benefits, or delegating government power to 
religious groups.” (citations omitted)). 
 141. See Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 933, 941 (1986) (“A noncoercion standard, of course, would not answer all 
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“coercion” to include government’s religious speech that changes onlookers’ 
behavior through peer pressure and other social dynamics; he found this to be the 
case of a prayer at a public high school graduation that students felt pressure to 
attend.142 Justice Scalia, in contrast, has defined impermissible “coercion” for 
Establishment Clause purposes much more narrowly to include only the threat or 
imposition of government punishment.143 
However defined, coercion provides the touchstone for identifying unlawful lies 
in other contexts as well. The Court, for example, has recognized that in certain 
circumstances an employer’s on-the-job lie may violate federal labor law by 
impermissibly coercing workers’ choices. More specifically, the Court held that an 
employer’s false threats that employees would lose their jobs if they voted to 
unionize were sufficiently coercive of its targets—economically vulnerable 
workers—to be unprotected by the First Amendment (and thus regulable by the 
National Labor Relations Act).144 
We might similarly interpret the Free Speech Clause to prohibit the government’s 
lies that coerce its targets’ beliefs, speech, or other expressive activity. Here too the 
subject matter of the government’s lie, as well as its setting and audience, may shape 
its coercive potential. As we have seen in the due process context, for example, the 
government’s false threats (like true threats) are especially likely to coerce its targets’ 
choices.145 Along these lines, Beth Orsoff urges attention to context when assessing 
the coercive potential of government threats in general:  
[T]he test should be whether the average reasonable person receiving the 
government criticism would perceive it as a threat, not whether the 
government official can legitimately execute the threat. Furthermore, this 
threat should not be narrowly construed only as a threat to prosecute. The 
government can threaten an individual as effectively in much more subtle 
ways. For example, threatening to audit an individual’s or business’ taxes 
for the past seven years, refusing to issue or renew a permit, or even 
hinting at a possible grand jury investigation could cause an individual 
or company to change behavior just as effectively as a threat of 
prosecution.146  
Government lies other than false threats or false assertions of legal consequences 
may also punish, deter, or otherwise coerce a reasonable target’s expressive 
                                                                                                                 
 
questions. For example, it obviously would not answer the question, ‘What is coercion?’ 
Enormous variance exists between the persecutions of old and the many subtle ways in which 
government action can distort religious choice today.”). 
 142. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593–95 (1992) (Kennedy, J.) (concluding that prayers 
by clergy at public high school graduations are inherently coercive given the pressure on 
students to attend graduation and then not to leave during the prayers). 
 143. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The coercion that was a hallmark of historical 
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by 
force of law and threat of penalty.” (emphasis in original)).  
 144. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). 
 145. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text. 
 146. Orsoff, supra note 14, at 234 (footnote omitted). 
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choices.147 Relatedly, then-professor Elena Kagan identified the government’s 
motive to censor speech with which it disagrees as the key to identifying a First 
Amendment violation and suggested that the First Amendment could be interpreted 
to constrain government speech (including, presumably, government lies) with such 
an improper motive.148 Examples might include the government’s efforts to retaliate 
against or otherwise silence its critics through its lies about them that inflict 
reputational or economic injury.149 Recall, for example, the FBI’s often-successful 
efforts during the 1950s and 1960s to silence antiwar protestors and other dissenters 
by spreading false information about them to friends, family members, and 
employers.150 As we have seen, some commentators have suggested that 
government’s expressive branding of a target as criminal is the functional equivalent 
of punishment for Due Process Clause purposes;151 the same may also be true for 
Free Speech Clause purposes. 
As another set of possibilities, consider government lies that seek to manipulate 
captive or otherwise vulnerable audiences in environments like schools or prisons 
where neither counterspeech nor exit is a meaningful option for the targets.152 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. Of course, government speech other than lies—including, but not limited to, true 
threats—may coerce their targets’ protected expression, and thus they too might violate the 
Free Speech Clause.  
 148. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 431–33 (1996). 
 149. See Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Meese, 939 F.2d 1011, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph, 
J., concurring) (“I believe the First Amendment may well prohibit government officials from 
spreading false, derogatory information in order to interfere with a publisher’s distribution of 
protected material. While this might require an inquiry into the official’s motive, it is not 
unusual for a First Amendment violation to turn on whether governmental conduct was 
undertaken for the purpose of infringing on someone’s speech.”); SCHAUER, supra note 138, 
at 133 (“[Government] shaming can be seen as just another weapon in law’s coercive 
arsenal.”); see also Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (considering the possibility 
that false government press release issued in retaliation for First Amendment activity may 
violate the First Amendment, but concluding that the contested government press release was 
not false). 
 150. STONE, supra note 3, at 490 (“In its effort to destabilize and incapacitate the left, FBI 
agents wrote letters to employers to cause the firing of antiwar activists; distributed fraudulent 
college newspapers defaming peace activists; sent anonymous letters to campaign contributors 
and other supporters of antiwar candidates to sabotage their campaigns; mailed anonymous 
letters to the spouses of antiwar activists, suggesting that their partners were having 
extramarital affairs; and spread false rumors that individuals were embezzling funds or 
secretly cooperating with the FBI.”). 
 151. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 152. See YUDOF, supra note 16, at 169 (“Perhaps a factor that should be taken into account 
in determining the likelihood of government distortion of the thinking processes of citizens is 
the degree to which the government has captured the audience.”); Martin H. Redish & Kevin 
Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the 
Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 99 (2002) (identifying free speech 
concerns with respect to government speech in public schools that seeks to indoctrinate “a 
captive audience of undeveloped and impressionable minds”); Brian C. Castello, Note, The 
Voice of Government as an Abridgement of First Amendment Rights of Speakers: Rethinking 
Meese v. Keene, 1989 DUKE L.J. 654, 676–77 (1989) (“Government speech that forces a 
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Government lies’ coercive potential may similarly increase with respect to matters 
where the government is a particularly trusted authority, as can be the case where it 
has monopoly access to the information underlying the lie.153  
As discussed earlier, coercion analysis is not without its drawbacks.154 Again, 
some may fear that it suffers from serious indeterminacy problems, as the line 
identifying the point at which government lies coerce their targets’ expressive 
choices remains less than bright. Just as is the case when determining when 
government’s religious speech is sufficiently coercive of targets’ behavior to violate 
the Establishment Clause or when a government lie is sufficiently coercive of its 
target’s liberty to violate the Due Process Clause, so too is there room to debate when 
the government’s lie is sufficiently coercive of its target’s expressive activity to 
violate the Free Speech Clause. Again, I do not propose to solve the definitional 
challenges of coercion here.155 Instead I simply urge that government lies may 
sometimes coerce listeners’ beliefs or speech in ways that are hard to distinguish 
from the government’s direct regulation of such expressive choices and thus should 
be understood to violate the Free Speech Clause. 
Others may wonder whether a focus on coercion is instead too narrow, in that it 
fails to address the many ways in which the government’s lies can inflict expressive 
harm even when they do not coerce their targets’ expressive activity.156 In the 
Establishment Clause setting, for example, Justice O’Connor applied endorsement 
(rather than coercion) analysis to find that the government violated a constitutional 
commitment to religious pluralism when it delivered a message that citizens’ status 
varies based on their religion (or nonreligion).157 Expressivist scholars might 
                                                                                                                 
 
captive audience to be subject to a particular viewpoint presents the clearest example of 
coerced consent.”). For similar reasons, courts not infrequently consider government’s 
religious speech in the public school setting as coercive for Establishment Clause purposes. 
See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Massaro, supra note 105, at 402–03 (urging that we consider “the extent to which 
government has monopoly power over the information in question” in determining whether 
and when government speech is the functional equivalent of direct regulation of speech). 
 154. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 155. See id.; see also Massaro, supra note 105, at 407 (“Distinguishing between 
permissible and impermissible government coercion requires nuance and a willingness to bend 
speech principles to accommodate conflicting political, historical, and other regulatory 
realities.”). 
 156. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” 
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. 
L. REV. 483, 506–07 (1993) (“An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes 
expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material 
consequences the action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental action is 
just as important as what that action does. Public policies can violate the Constitution not only 
because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning they convey 
demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values. On this unusual conception of 
constitutional harm, when a governmental action expresses disrespect for such values, it can 
violate the Constitution.” (emphasis in original)).  
 157. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“As a theoretical matter, the endorsement test captures 
the essential command of the Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not make 
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similarly view government’s disparaging speech—including, presumably, its 
defamatory lies—as inflicting a constitutional wrong regardless of any coercive 
effect on targets’ expressive choices.158  
But an expressivist approach is arguably even more indeterminate than one that 
relies on coercion and thus may exacerbate concerns about separation of powers, 
institutional competence, and chilling valuable government speech.159 By proposing 
that we understand the First Amendment to prohibit those government lies that 
coerce their targets’ expressive choices, I am suggesting an approach that is more 
likely to satisfy standing doctrine’s requirement of particularized injury160 (and that 
is arguably more manageable) while tolerating, as a constitutional matter, lies that 
inflict significant if less tangible harms. This is no easy choice, and in so proposing 
I do not mean to suggest that noncoercive government lies are unworthy of our 
concern. To the contrary, some noncoercive lies by the government may still warrant 
statutory or political redress even if they do not injure specific due process or free 
speech interests.161 The next Part thus examines a range of nonconstitutional 
approaches to the harms posed by certain government lies. 
III. NONCONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING GOVERNMENT LIES 
Just as the preceding Part’s due process and free speech discussion relied heavily 
on contextual analysis, this Part examines a variety of nonconstitutional alternatives 
                                                                                                                 
 
a person’s religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the political community by 
conveying a message ‘that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.’” 
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment))). 
 158. Tebbe, supra note 127 (drawing from free speech and equal protection doctrine to 
identify a constitutional theory prohibiting the government from engaging in certain 
disparaging speech).  
 159. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 156, at 513–14 (“Yet, when courts recognize 
expressive harms, this traditional requirement of individualized harm comes under 
considerable pressure. Expressive harms focus on social perceptions, public understandings, 
and messages; they involve the government’s symbolic endorsement of certain values in ways 
not obviously tied to any discrete, individualized harm. A significant tension, therefore, exists 
between recognition of expressive harms and traditional requirements of individualized 
wrongs.” (emphasis in original)). Elsewhere I have explored the advantages and disadvantages 
of coercion and expressivist analyses as applied to government’s hateful speech. Helen 
Norton, The Equal Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 159, 198–208 (2012). 
 160. As a related example, courts have recognized certain circumstances where 
government’s religious speech inflicts sufficiently concrete and particularized injuries upon 
listeners to satisfy the requirements of standing and empower the federal courts to consider 
Establishment Clause challenges to such speech. See David Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm? 
Nontaxpayer Standing to Challenge Religious Symbols, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1071, 
1075 (2011) (describing “two basic tests” among the courts of appeal: “The dominant 
approach requires a plaintiff to show some version of direct and unwelcome contact with the 
challenged symbol or display. A second approach requires a plaintiff to show that he altered 
his behavior to avoid contact with the allegedly offensive display.” (footnote omitted)).  
 161. See infra notes 209–11 and accompanying text. 
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for addressing government lies that occur in specific harm-threatening contexts. It 
thus identifies a menu of possibilities that include statutory and political remedies 
for addressing the government’s deliberate falsehoods to certain audiences, on 
certain topics, by certain speakers, or in other settings that threaten especially serious 
harm. 
A. Statutory and Other Legal Constraints  
In addition to (or instead of) constitutional approaches that require the development 
of new doctrine, a variety of statutory options remain available to constrain certain 
harmful government lies. Not only do legislatures as well as courts have a role to play 
in protecting constitutional values,162 but tailored statutory alternatives can ease some 
of the enforcement challenges described above by addressing government lies in 
specific contexts that threaten especially grave harms.163 Such legislative efforts can 
draw from or add to a number of statutes that already prohibit lies in specific contexts.  
For example, some statutes prohibit certain lies in certain settings by speakers 
generally, including but not limited to government speakers. Perjury law offers an 
especially prominent illustration of a setting-specific approach, as it targets lies under 
oath (by governmental and nongovernmental speakers alike) that are material to certain 
high-stakes decisions.164 Other examples include laws that target dishonest or corrupt 
behavior that includes (but is not limited to) lies, such as statutes that prohibit 
obstruction of justice.165 Note that perjury and related laws criminalize lies that threaten 
not only individualized and concrete harms to litigants when they deceive decision 
makers and thus lead to erroneous verdicts,166 but also more collective harms to the 
public’s trust in the integrity of the justice system.167  
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. See Magarian, supra note 33, at 168–69 (“Congress as well as courts can safeguard 
constitutional values. . . . Statutes have normative and practical advantages over the judicial 
process because Congress is a politically accountable institution with the mandate and 
resources to make difficult policy decisions.” (footnote omitted)).  
 163. Relatedly, Justice Breyer recommended that legislatures address the most harmful lies 
by private speakers while remaining attentive to First Amendment concerns by crafting 
narrowly tailored statutes that address specific harmful contexts. United States v. Alvarez, 132 
S. Ct. 2537, 2556 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (recommending that a statute 
require “a showing that the false statement caused specific harm or at least was material, or 
focus its coverage on lies most likely to be harmful or on contexts where such lies are most 
likely to cause harm”).  
 164. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012); see also United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 
376 (1953) (describing federal perjury law as prohibiting a “false statement wilfully made as 
to facts material to the hearing” under an oath authorized by federal law and taken before a 
competent tribunal, officer, or person). 
 165. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 185–86. 
 166. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate, 1993 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 132 (“[Knowingly false evidence] attempts to distort, distract, and 
mislead. At best, such evidence will waste time and effort in requiring energy to be devoted 
to demonstrating that the testimony is false; at worst, the falsehood will not be revealed and 
the jury will reach the wrong substantive result.”). 
 167. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546 (plurality opinion) (“Perjury undermines the function 
and province of the law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the basis of the legal 
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Other statutes target lies made to certain audiences. One example is the Federal 
False Statements Act, which prohibits material falsity in communications with the 
federal government.168 The Act criminalizes lies to the government (including but not 
limited to those made by other government speakers) that are “predictably capable of 
affecting” government decision making,169 without regard to whether the lies were 
intended to obtain monetary gain or whether they caused any concrete harm to the 
government.170 Examples of lies prohibited by the Act include not only lies that may 
affect decisions to grant a government benefit or contract but also decisions about 
whether and how to deploy the government’s investigative energies.171 The statute’s 
reach thus includes lies that may pose collective harms to the public in terms of 
depleted or diverted governmental resources.  
Defamation law takes a harm-specific approach by targeting lies (and other speech 
that may be defamatory even if not deliberately false) that damage individual 
reputation. Although legislatures currently shield many government actors from 
monetary liability for their defamatory lies with a variety of immunities,172 they need 
                                                                                                                 
 
system.”). 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly 
and willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years . . . or 
both.”). 
 169. E.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) (explaining that a statement 
is “material” if “predictably capable of affecting” a government decision). 
 170. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 412–13 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring 
in judgment) (describing how the Act was originally interpreted to apply to lies intended to 
defraud the federal government out of its property or money but was later amended to more 
broadly prohibit deceptive communications that interfered with or obstructed lawful 
government functions); United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 71 (1984) (same). 
 171. See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) (“The amendment indicated the 
congressional intent to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and 
agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described.”); 
Varat, supra note 12, at 1114–15 (“Lies in the course of official government proceedings risk 
producing false beliefs in the minds of official investigators, risking perversion of the 
investigative process. Arguably, the deceptions in those instances also interfere with the 
reasoning processes of—and the respect owed to—the deceived parties, and are likely to 
influence their behavior.”). 
 172. Note that the Speech or Debate Clause provides a constitutional defense to certain 
defamatory speech by federal legislators only in certain limited circumstances. See, e.g., 
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (“Voting and preparing committee reports 
are the individual and collective expressions of opinion within the legislative process. As such, 
they are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Newsletters and press releases, by contrast, 
are primarily means of informing those outside the legislative forum; they represent the views 
and will of a single Member. It does not disparage either their value or their importance to 
hold that they are not entitled to the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.”); Doe v. 
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1973) (“Our cases make perfectly apparent, however, that 
everything a Member of Congress may regularly do is not a legislative act within the protection 
of the Speech or Debate Clause. . . . Members of Congress may frequently be in touch with 
and seek to influence the Executive Branch of Government, but this conduct ‘though generally 
done, is not protected legislative activity.’ Nor does the Speech or Debate Clause protect a 
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not do so. Some states, for example, choose to permit defamation actions against state 
or local government speakers,173 and some commentators urge the amendment of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act to permit similar actions against federal government 
speakers.174  
The foregoing examples prohibit lies in certain settings, to certain audiences, or 
that cause certain harms regardless of the identity of the speaker. Other 
nonconstitutional constraints on lies take a speaker-specific approach. As an 
illustration, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct impose an explicit duty of truthfulness on judges and on government actors 
(and others) who are also members of the bar.175 For example, Arkansas suspended 
former President Clinton’s state bar license for five years176 after a district court’s 
finding that he was in contempt of court “by giving false, misleading and evasive 
answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process” in Paula Jones’s civil 
litigation against him.177 As is the case with perjury prohibitions, such constraints 
seek not only to address the potential harms of deception to individual parties but 
also harms to the public’s trust in the administration of justice more broadly.  
Some speaker-specific approaches target lies only by certain government speakers. 
For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct impose heightened 
requirements of truthfulness on prosecutors as a particular type of government 
speaker,178 again to prevent harm both to individual litigants as well as to the public’s 
collective trust in the criminal justice system.  
                                                                                                                 
 
private republication of documents introduced and made public at a committee hearing, 
although the hearing was unquestionably part of the legislative process.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972))); Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 
311, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“We reaffirm the common law rule and settled constitutional design 
that elected representatives must answer for libelous statements made outside the scope of 
their legislative duties.”). 
 173. See Nadel v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
 174. See Cortez, supra note 30, at 1391. 
 175. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(11) (2007) (prohibiting judges and 
judicial candidates from “knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, mak[ing] any 
false or misleading statement”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2014) (“A 
lawyer shall not knowingly[] make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2014) (“In the course of representing a client a lawyer 
shall not knowingly[] make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person[.]”); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2014) (“It is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to[] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]”). 
Although many disciplinary actions under these rules punish lies like fraud or perjury that 
violate other legal constraints, some hold lawyers and judges to higher standards of 
truthfulness by punishing lies that would likely not be punishable if uttered by nonattorneys. 
See In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002); In re Carpenter, 95 P.3d 203 (Or. 2004).  
 176. Neal v. Clinton, No. CIV 2000-5677, 2001 WL 34355768, at *3 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Jan. 
19, 2001). The State also assessed a fine of $25,000. Id.  
 177. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1127 (E.D. Ark. 1999). 
 178. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2014) (requiring prosecutors not only 
to refrain from lying but also to make affirmative disclosures in some circumstances); Bennett 
L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 313–14 (2001) 
(“[T]he prosecutor has a legal and ethical duty to promote truth and to refrain from conduct 
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The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) may offer another possible constraint on 
certain government speakers. Some commentators have urged courts to interpret, or 
Congress to amend, the APA to invalidate any final agency action as arbitrary and 
capricious when the agency seeks to support it with inaccurate assertions (presumably 
including lies).179 Relatedly, some courts have interpreted the National Environmental 
Protection Act (NEPA) to prohibit agencies from issuing environmental impact 
statements that are based on false, inaccurate, or misleading data.180 Consider too the 
proposed (but never enacted) speaker-specific Executive Accountability Act, which 
would criminalize executive officials’ knowing and willful false statements to promote 
the government's use of military force.181 Again, such lies can threaten both individual 
and collective harm. 
Statutory approaches also offer opportunities for specifying nontraditional remedies 
for harmful government lies that may lessen enforcement concerns.182 For example, a 
statute could require removal or rescission of the government’s lie rather than impose 
civil damages183 (much less criminal sanctions), or could require counterspeech in the 
form of an official declaration or reprimand. Along these lines, James O’Reilly has 
                                                                                                                 
 
that impedes truth. The courts have explicitly recognized the existence of this duty, and have 
implicitly recognized this duty by reversing convictions when a prosecutor engages in conduct 
that undermines the search for truth.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 314–15 (“The duty is found 
as well in the prosecutor’s domination of the criminal justice system and his virtual monopoly 
of the fact-finding process. More than any other party in the criminal justice system, the 
prosecutor has superior knowledge of the facts that are used to convict the defendant, exclusive 
control of those facts, and a unique ability to shape the presentation of those facts to the fact-
finder.” (footnote omitted)).  
 179. See Cortez, supra note 30, at 1376–77 (“Congress should declare that adverse 
publicity is ‘final agency action’ under the APA and is reviewable for an abuse of discretion 
. . . .”); id. at 1377 (“[C]ourts should recognize a cause of action under the APA or via 
procedural due process, if applicable.”); O’Reilly, supra note 30, at 536. 
 180. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 811–13 (9th Cir. 
2005) (finding that the agency’s use of inflated, inaccurate, and misleading data violated 
NEPA). 
 181. H.R. 743, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to prohibit knowingly and willfully making 
materially false statements for purpose of garnering congressional support for use of American 
military); S. 1529, 111th Cong. (2009) (same).  
 182. Remedies for constitutional violations generally include civil damages, injunctions, 
declaratory relief, the exclusion of evidence (acquired through a constitutional violation), and 
habeas relief. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Rodriguez v. City of 
Houston, and Remedial Rationing, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 82, 83–84 (2009) (describing 
various remedies); Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the 
Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2454–79 (2014) (same). For a proposal urging greater 
creativity and flexibility in devising remedies that balance speech and other concerns more 
generally, see David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135.  
 183. On the other hand, others suggest that damages remedies are among the most effective 
vehicles for deterring harmful government behavior. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 56, at 269–70; 
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
363, 368 (arguing that a damages remedy would be more effective in deterring Fourth 
Amendment violations than the exclusionary rule). Note, however, that damage awards for the 
deprivation of constitutional rights that involve neither physical injury nor economic loss are 
often quite limited. See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309–11 (1986). 
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proposed the statutory creation of agency ombuds charged with responding to 
complaints about inaccurate agency speech (presumably including complaints about 
alleged agency lies).184 The United Kingdom has adopted a similar approach, creating 
an independent government watchdog agency specifically charged with assessing and 
publicizing the (in)accuracy of the government’s speech.185  
Finally, legislatures can strengthen and expand statutory protections for government 
whistleblowers who help expose the government’s lies (and other misconduct).186 Such 
statutory protections are especially important in light of the Supreme Court’s failure to 
protect many government whistleblowers as a matter of constitutional law. Indeed, the 
Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos frustrated efforts to hold the government 
accountable for its lies by rejecting the First Amendment challenge of a prosecutor 
punished for reporting what he believed to be a misrepresentation by the police in 
seeking a search warrant.187 Related legal efforts could include more vigorous 
enforcement of the Freedom of Information Act in which judges are more skeptical and 
demanding of the government’s factual claims.188 
B. Political Checks  
Political remedies offer alternative means for constraining the government’s 
deliberate falsehoods.189 Political responses to government lies include campaigning, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. O’Reilly, supra note 30, at 538–39; see also Cortez, supra note 30, at 1438 (urging 
use of an ombuds or chief information officer “to review disputes about agency publicity” to 
“generate more credibility with industries and the media, and perhaps deter litigation”). 
 185. See Carl Bialik, This U.K. Sheriff Cites Officials for Serious Statistical 
Violations, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB124398720006979435 [http://perma.cc/LQ27-TLSD]. 
 186. Because the problems of government lies are not unrelated to the problems of 
government secrets, we can also learn a great deal from recommendations by secrecy experts. 
See Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First 
Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 409, 411 (2013) (urging that “leakers merit robust First Amendment protections against 
prosecution” to support the information flow necessary for a thriving democracy); Mary-Rose 
Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security 
Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233 (2008) (discussing the value of leaks and whistleblowers in 
ensuring government accountability).  
 187. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment 
does not protect public employees’ speech pursuant to their jobs—including their truthful 
reports of government lies and other forms of misconduct—so long as such reports are part of 
their official duties). I have discussed this problem extensively elsewhere. See Helen Norton, 
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to 
Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009) (describing multiple cases in which lower 
courts invoked Garcetti to permit government employers to punish employees who truthfully 
sought to expose the government’s misconduct). The Court’s more recent decision in Lane v. 
Franks narrows Garcetti in only one very limited context, holding that the First Amendment 
protects public employees who testify truthfully as to government misconduct when such 
testimony is not part of their regular job duties. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377–82 
(2014). 
 188. See Jenny-Brooke Condon, Illegal Secrets, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1099 (2014). 
 189. See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles 
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voting, lobbying, petitioning, and (with respect to certain government speakers) 
impeachment.190 Some observers point to Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to seek 
re-election and Richard Nixon’s resignation as examples of successful political 
challenges to executive branch lies about military matters or its own misconduct.191 
Political efforts also include vigorous legislative oversight of alleged executive 
branch lies; examples include congressional proposals to establish a select committee 
to investigate incomplete or inaccurate information provided by the federal 
government’s intelligence operations.192 Legislatures can also deny funding to 
agencies engaged in lying.193  
Political pressure might also encourage the government’s self-regulation of its lies 
and other inaccuracies. James O’Reilly, for example, has urged agencies voluntarily 
to adopt internal controls for rooting out inaccuracies more generally:  
Agencies should articulate written standards for issuing different forms 
of adverse publicity, particularly via new media. These standards should 
address the content of announcements and establish both internal 
procedures for issuing publicity and procedures for private parties to 
request corrections or retractions through timely administrative appeals 
—all subject to reasonable exceptions for emergencies and other 
justifications in the public interest. Agency self-restraint is perhaps the 
most effective and most realistic response.194  
Such an approach could also be applied specifically to government agencies’ lies. 
Agency Inspector Generals (IGs) offer a related internal check on government’s 
inaccurate speech, including but not limited to its lies. Nathan Cortez, for example, 
has described how the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Inspector General 
investigated and exposed the agency’s inaccurate publicity allegedly intended to 
                                                                                                                 
 
into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 101 (2013) (“In the political sphere, we have many 
extralegal mechanisms to reinforce fiduciary obligations: elections, civil society, newspapers, 
and watchdog groups are as much a part of the tapestry of fiduciary governance as courts 
are.”). 
 190. The U.S. Constitution, for example, provides for the impeachment of federal judges 
and certain executive officers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 191. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 229. 
 192. Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 917 (discussing structural checks to executive branch 
secret keeping); Papandrea, supra note 9, at 468; see also id. at 466 (describing other political 
checks, including Congress’s ability to “conduct hearings, subpoena testimony and 
documents, leverage its power in the appropriations and appointments process, and pass 
statutes that require periodic reports from the executive branch”). 
 193. Congress has long barred federal agencies from unauthorized expenditures to engage 
in “publicity or propaganda.” E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 
§ 718, 128 Stat. 5, 234 (“No part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall 
be used directly or indirectly, including by private contractor, for publicity or propaganda 
purposes within the United States not heretofore authorized by the Congress.”). The 
Government Accountability Office has interpreted (but rarely enforced) this language to 
include agency lies and other forms of deception about the source of its communications. See 
Helen Norton, Campaign Speech Law with a Twist: When the Government Is the Speaker, Not 
the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 229–32 (2011).  
 194. See Cortez, supra note 30, at 1376. 
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embarrass its target.195 More recently, the Veterans’ Administration’s Office of 
Inspector General documented a variety of misrepresentations by the agency with 
respect to waiting times and other matters related to patient care.196 
Norms of behavior offer another potential nonlegal check on government lies. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, a Ministerial Code outlines expectations of ethical 
conduct for ministers who lead government departments.197 Section 1.1 of the Code 
states that “Ministers of the Crown are expected to behave in a way that upholds the 
highest standards of propriety,”198 and section 1.2(c) describes this expectation more 
specifically to prohibit lies to Parliament: 
It is of paramount importance that Ministers give accurate and truthful 
information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest 
opportunity. Ministers who knowingly mislead Parliament will be 
expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister[.]199 
Without question, the legal200 and political201 approaches described in this Part 
are far from perfect. But the range of available possibilities should encourage us to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. Id. at 1424; see also Papandrea, supra note 9, at 473 (“IGs have played an important 
role in increasing transparency, arguing for reform, and pushing for accountability.”). 
 196. VA. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT NO. 14-02603
-267, VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION: REVIEW OF ALLEGED PATIENT DEATHS, PATIENT 
WAIT TIMES, AND SCHEDULING PRACTICES AT THE PHOENIX VA HEALTH CARE SYSTEM iii (2014), 
available at http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-14-02603-267.pdf [http://perma.cc/B3J4
-DHKA]; see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Watchdog Says V.A. Officials Lied, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/us/watchdog-says-va-officials-lied.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/S45F-52E7]. 
 197. CABINET OFFICE, MAY 2010 MINISTERIAL CODE, 2009-10, H.C. DEP. 2010-1253 
(U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/61402/ministerial-code-may-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/EY2A-3C79].  
 198. Id. § 1.1; see also Lesley Dingle & Bradley Miller, A Summary of Recent 
Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 71, 88–89, 96 (2005) 
(describing the expectations generated by these nonlegal norms); Rt. Hon. Lord Goldsmith 
QC, Keynote Address, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1155, 1156–58 (2007) (same). Lawrence Sager has 
relatedly argued that government officials have an “obligation to obey constitutional norms at 
their unenforced margins” by “fashion[ing] their own conceptions of these norms and 
measur[ing] their conduct by reference to these conceptions.” Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair 
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 
1227 (1978). 
 199. MAY 2010 MINISTERIAL CODE § 1.2(c).  
 200. For example, some commentators have urged that courts interpret, or Congress 
amend, the Federal False Statements Act and similar statutes prohibiting lies to the 
government to apply to a relatively narrow range of settings to prevent unfair surprise to the 
unwary. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 409 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (suggesting a more circumscribed focus for the Act). 
 201. For example, Mary-Rose Papandrea is among those commentators to have identified 
limits on the effectiveness of various political checks. See Papandrea, supra note 9, at 466 
(“The executive, however, strongly resists Congress’s attempts to force the disclosure of 
information, and there is very limited opportunity for judicial review of these interbranch 
disputes.”); id. at 473 (“Nevertheless, the ability of IGs to check executive power suffers from 
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think carefully about the specific settings or other circumstances that make 
government lies especially harmful and then consider targeted nonconstitutional 
responses.  
IV. PROBLEMS AND APPLICATIONS 
This Part applies the constitutional and nonconstitutional approaches described in 
Parts II and III to a range of government lies. For these purposes, please assume that 
the hypotheticals presented here are “lies” as I have defined them: false assertions of 
fact known by the government speakers to be untrue and made with the intention that 
listeners understand them to be true.  
We start our analysis by assessing whether the government lie in question 
infringes specific due process or free speech rights. If so, we apply strict scrutiny to 
the government’s decision to lie; if not, we continue our analysis by first articulating 
the remaining harm (if any) with as much specificity as possible and then considering 
nonconstitutional approaches for addressing those harms.  
More specifically, the government’s decision to lie in ways that deprive or coerce 
the deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty should trigger strict scrutiny 
under the Due Process Clause, and the government’s decision to lie in ways that 
coerce targets’ protected expression should trigger strict scrutiny under the Free 
Speech Clause. The government’s decision to lie should fail this scrutiny when 
motivated by nonpublic (and thus noncompelling) reasons—for example, when the 
government has lied to protect itself from legal or political accountability, for its 
financial gain, or to silence or punish a critic’s protected expression. Governmental 
decisions to lie should also fail this scrutiny even when motivated by compelling 
public reasons when they are unnecessary to achieve such ends; for example, 
coercive lies are by no means the only way—and thus are not necessary—for the 
government to secure confessions or other evidence to support criminal convictions. 
In certain rare circumstances, the government’s decision to lie may survive strict 
scrutiny when necessary to achieve compelling government interests. This may be 
the case when time permits no other option—for example, where the government’s 
coercive lies are necessary to calm public panic in a public safety emergency or to 
prevent a criminal from hurting a victim.202 Finally, under certain extreme 
                                                                                                                 
 
significant limitations; importantly, IGs are appointed and removable by the President, and 
they cannot report even serious wrongdoing to Congress without first giving the relevant 
agency head the opportunity to delete sensitive information.”). 
 202. For example, the Court has found that police interrogation of a suspect as to the 
whereabouts of his gun did not violate the Constitution even absent Miranda warnings when 
the questioner’s purpose was to protect the public from the gun rather than to secure a 
confession or other evidence. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); see also United 
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting 
the circumstances in which lies can be valuable as including lies told to calm public panic or 
otherwise protect public safety). For the very rare exceptions in which the Court has upheld 
the government’s regulation of speech under a strict scrutiny analysis, see Williams-Yulee v. 
Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding state bar association’s rule prohibiting judicial 
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions); Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (upholding federal law that criminalized the knowing provision 
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circumstances, even noncoercive lies by the government may violate substantive due 
process protections when they lack any reasonable justification (i.e., when they shock 
the conscience with their outrageousness) and thus constitute an abuse of 
governmental power.  
A return to the hypotheticals offered in the Introduction helps illustrate these 
points.203 Consider first a secretary of state’s office—the office charged with 
administering elections within that state—that lies to certain audiences about 
where polls are located or when the polls will close in hopes of suppressing their 
vote and increasing its political allies’ re-election prospects.204 Such lies are likely 
to prevent some number of individuals who intended to vote from successfully 
doing so and thus are functionally indistinguishable from locking the doors to the 
polls. In other words, these lies—like lies about the existence of, or consequences 
of exercising, constitutional rights more broadly—directly deprive targets of a 
constitutionally protected right for reasons that should fail strict scrutiny, and thus 
violate the Due Process Clause.  
As discussed earlier, the government’s lies present especially hard 
constitutional problems when the causal connection between the lie and the 
deprivation of a protected liberty interest remains unclear.205 For these reasons, 
consider next a department of labor’s lie that deliberately misstates unemployment 
rates to improve the incumbent’s prospects in an upcoming election. On one hand, 
the government’s nonpublic purpose here is identical to that in the polls 
hypothetical above, such that the decision to lie will fail strict scrutiny if strict 
scrutiny is applied. On the other hand, however, the threshold question whether the 
lie has coerced voting rights (which is the trigger for the decision to apply strict 
scrutiny) presents a harder constitutional problem here. The multitude of reasons 
that inform voters’ choices greatly complicates efforts to establish a direct 
connection between the lie and its targets’ voting decisions. In other words, the 
first example involved a government lie about the process of voting that is very 
likely to affect targets’ ability to cast a vote, while this second example involves a 
government lie about a substantive matter that may or may not influence voters’ 
decisions. Nor are voters generally particularly vulnerable or captive (except, 
perhaps, at the polling place206), thus lessening the lie’s coercive potential. For 
                                                                                                                 
 
of material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization as applied to plaintiff’s 
attempt to provide money, training, and advocacy to groups so characterized); Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding content-based ban on political 
speech within 100 feet of polling place). 
 203. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 204. In addition to potential constitutional claims, moreover, lies in this very specific 
setting can also be addressed by statutes prohibiting lies about how, where, and when to vote. 
See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1005.1 (2011) (prohibiting knowingly false communication of 
election information about the time, date, or place of voting). Lies about voting rights that 
specifically disadvantage voters based on race may also violate the Voting Rights Act. See 52 
U.S.C.A. § 10101 (2015). 
 205. See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text. As discussed earlier, hard questions 
can also arise about whether the government’s lie has deprived its target of what is actually a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding state ban 
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these reasons, this government lie is harder to characterize as depriving, or 
coercing the deprivation of, liberty in ways that should trigger strict scrutiny. A 
variety of nonconstitutional options may thus be more appropriate for addressing 
the harms posed by such lies. For example, a legislature could establish agency 
watchdogs empowered to scrutinize the agency’s own data in contested cases. 
Other options include vigorous oversight by legislatures or inspectors general as 
well as political pressure to adopt self-policing protocols. 
Next consider a governor’s office that issues an investigative report or a press 
release that deliberately and falsely covers up its own illegal conduct. The harms are 
largely the same as described in the preceding example: although the lie frustrates a 
range of free speech values (especially, but not only, democratic self-governance), it 
does not coerce speech or voting decisions, even while intended to shape them.207 If, 
as I have proposed, we focus on coercion as the appropriate constitutional touchstone 
in most cases, we must acknowledge that we are choosing to insulate (for 
constitutional purposes) government lies that inflict significant if less specific harms 
in exchange for a more manageable enforcement standard—again, no easy choice. 
Here too nonconstitutional options, however imperfect, may be preferable. For 
example, government’s lies about its own misconduct can be addressed by statutory 
approaches that target certain specific settings (e.g., lies that obstruct justice, lies 
under oath, or lies in the context of legislative hearings or other investigative 
settings). Such efforts can be reinforced by vigorous legislative oversight that 
requires the relevant officials to testify under oath or in other settings regulated by 
statute, as well as by strengthened legal protections for whistleblowers who can 
expose these lies.208 
Consider next an agency’s defamatory targeting of its critics. Suppose, for 
example, that a state enforcement agency issues a press release that seeks to 
punish and silence a longtime critic by falsely asserting that she has engaged in 
illegal misconduct and thus damages her job and business opportunities. This lie 
seeks to coerce its target’s expressive choices for nonpublic—and thus 
noncompellling—reasons that fail strict scrutiny, and violates the Free Speech 
Clause.  
                                                                                                                 
 
on soliciting votes and distributing campaign materials within 100 feet of polling place 
entrance in part to achieve state’s compelling interest in protecting voters from intimidation 
and undue influence). 
 207. As noted supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text, this Article focuses only on lies 
by a government body or by an individual empowered to speak for such a body. It thus does 
not address lies by individuals—including individual political candidates, both challengers 
and incumbent—when expressing their own views in a personal capacity and who thus have 
First Amendment rights of their own.  
 208. Of course, the constitutional and statutory checks discussed throughout this Article 
only operate after the fact once a lie has come to light through, for example, investigation by 
the press or by other government actors, or exposure by whistleblowers. In addition to 
punishing such lies (and perhaps compensating or redressing their victims) after the fact, 
however, such checks may be valuable by deterring such lies before the fact, as well as by 
performing law’s “expressive function” in establishing norms apart from controlling or 
punishing behavior directly. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).  
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The government’s defamatory lie may also deprive its target of interests protected 
by the Due Process Clause by damaging her reputation. To be sure, this would require 
the Court to revisit Paul v. Davis to hold that reputation is a constitutionally protected 
liberty (or property) interest.209 Because reputation remains valuable even if not 
constitutionally protected, these concerns can also be addressed through 
nonconstitutional means like eliminating government immunities to statutory or 
common law defamation claims.  
As yet another example, consider a Surgeon General’s Office that undertakes 
an informational campaign in the public schools that seeks to boost sales of 
products manufactured by the administration’s political ally by falsely reporting 
their health effects. Such lies frustrate the search for truth (especially given the 
office’s presumed expertise on health matters), undermine listener autonomy by 
skewing consumer and health choices, and may distort political debates about 
proposed regulatory action. Here the government’s lie targets a relatively captive 
and vulnerable audience of young people in the public schools who have limited 
options for exit and counterspeech. The combination of a vulnerable audience 
together with the government’s nonpublic motive distinguish this example, in my 
view, as a more direct threat to constitutionally protected interests than 
controversial public education campaigns more generally, and thus this lie may be 
sufficiently coercive of its targets’ expressive choices to violate the Free Speech 
Clause. Nonconstitutional options also remain available, and again include 
setting- and audience-specific statutes, the establishment of agency watchdogs, and 
vigorous legislative oversight.  
Finally, government lies about the justification for military force offer 
especially vexing problems, as they portend disastrous harms together with 
substantial enforcement challenges. For example, a President’s lies to Congress 
and to the public about the reasons for U.S. military intervention threaten a range 
of shattering injuries, both individual and collective, as they can lead to the loss of 
lives by both civilians and soldiers, the ruinous diversion of national resources, and 
a substantial loss in public trust. Such lies also undermine the public’s ability to 
engage in democratic self-governance, threaten listeners’ autonomy by skewing 
their political choices, and frustrate the search for truth. In addition, such lies 
concern a national security matter on which the President will often have greater 
(and perhaps monopoly) informational access, thus limiting opportunities for 
meaningful rebuttal.  
On the other hand, establishing the link between the President’s lie and the actual 
decision to go to war (and the resulting loss of life and liberty for due process 
purposes) may be difficult, as many factors generally influence that causal chain of 
events. Characterizing such a lie as coercive is similarly challenging, as the 
congressional and public audience is neither captive nor vulnerable (except, perhaps, 
to the extent that the President has a monopoly on information on this topic). 
Furthermore, one can easily anticipate that constitutional litigation challenging such 
assertions as lies might be motivated by partisan rather than public interests, and that 
the judiciary might thus be reluctant to second-guess choices made by the President 
                                                                                                                 
 
 209. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.  
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when exercising her Article II powers.210 Nonconstitutional possibilities include 
enhanced protections for whistleblowers who can expose the lie, vigorous 
enforcement of the Freedom of Information Act, and aggressive congressional 
oversight. In light of the challenges raised by constitutional enforcement efforts in 
this context, many may prefer these nonconstitutional responses as the best among 
imperfect options. 
These complexities suggest that the government’s most catastrophic lies may 
be those especially resistant to redress under an individual-rights framework that 
offers possibilities for constraining only those government lies that injure 
identifiable individuals in relatively tangible ways. Such a framework may be 
considerably less well-suited to address more collective harms, no matter how 
severe.  
But perhaps lies about the justification for military force may be among the 
extreme cases where the dreadful consequences of the government’s lie coupled 
with a corrupt governmental motive (and the government’s motive will assuredly 
be key to this determination) are sufficiently outrageous to constitute an 
unconstitutional abuse of executive power. In other words, this may be among those 
government lies that are so venal that they could, and should, shock our collective 
conscience and thus be found to breach our expectations—protected by the Due 
Process Clause—that our government should not behave outrageously in its 
dealings with us.211  
CONCLUSION 
Lies are complicated and powerful, and so is the government. The government’s 
lies can be devastating. They can also sometimes be relatively harmless, and 
occasionally even helpful in advancing the public’s interest. We need to empower 
our government to operate effectively to protect us and our interests, even while 
we reasonably fear, and should take steps to protect ourselves from, its ability to 
harm us. As Michael Walzer has written, “I suspect we shall not abolish lying at 
all, but we might see to it that fewer lies were told if we contrived to deny power 
and glory to the greatest liars—except, of course, in the case of those lucky few 
whose extraordinary achievements make us forget the lies they told.”212 In this 
Article, I have suggested a range of approaches that seek to “deny power and glory 
to the greatest liars” even while recognizing that some harmful government lies 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Law Matters, Even to the Executive, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
1015, 1015 (2014) (describing national security policy as the area in which “we find judicial 
deference at its highest, the centralization of modern government at its most pronounced, 
delegations of authority to the executive at their broadest, and contempt for idealism at its 
most self-satisfied”). 
 211. Relatedly, recall that public fiduciary theory suggests that the public should expect 
the same loyalty from its government as it would from other fiduciaries in whom it has placed 
its trust. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Due Process Clause to forbid government action that shocks the conscience offers a possible 
constitutional basis for enforcing those expectations as a constitutional matter. 
 212. See Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 160, 180 (1973). 
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will nevertheless likely escape redress. In so doing, I have sought to start a 
conversation about how courts—and the rest of us—might think about the 
constitutional and other implications of the government’s lies, recognizing that 
others might choose to strike the balance quite differently. 
 
